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ABSTRACT
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with
guaranteed good properties even when players participate
in multiple different mechanisms simultaneously or sequen-
tially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms, related to
smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought
of as mechanisms that generate approximately market clear-
ing prices. We show that smooth mechanisms result in high
quality outcome in equilibrium both in the full information
setting and in the Bayesian setting with uncertainty about
participants, as well as in learning outcomes. Our main re-
sult is to show that such mechanisms compose well: smooth-
ness locally at each mechanism implies efficiency globally.
For mechanisms where good performance requires that
bidders do not bid above their value, we identify the notion
of a weakly smooth mechanism. Weakly smooth mecha-
nisms, such as the Vickrey auction, are approximately ef-
ficient under the no-overbidding assumption. Similar to
smooth mechanisms, weakly smooth mechanisms behave well
in composition, and have high quality outcome in equilib-
rium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information
setting and in the Bayesian setting, as well as in learning
outcomes.
In most of the paper we assume participants have quasi-
linear valuations. We also extend some of our results to
settings where participants have budget constraints.
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of our paper is to initiate the study of efficient
mechanism design with guaranteed good properties even
when players participate in multiple different mechanisms
either simultaneously or sequentially. In most markets, (e.g.
online markets) people participate in various mechanisms
and the value of each player overall is a complex function
of their outcomes. Predominantly, these mechanisms are
run by different principals (e.g. different sellers on eBay or
different ad-exchange platforms) and coordinating them to
run a single combined mechanism is infeasible or impracti-
cal. The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of how
to design mechanisms so that the efficiency guarantees for a
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single mechanism (when studied in isolation) carry over to
the same or approximately the same guarantees for a market
composed of such mechanisms. The key question considered
in this paper can be summarized as follows:
What properties of local mechanisms guarantee
global efficiency in a market composed of such mech-
anisms?
Mechanism design is a subject with a long and distinguished
history aiming to design games that produce a certain de-
sired outcome (such as revenue or social welfare maximiza-
tion) in equilibrium. However, traditional mechanism design
considered such mechanisms only in isolation, an assumption
not so realistic in online markets, where players can cover
their needs through multiple different mechanisms. Mech-
anism design has mostly focused on truthful mechanisms,
where players participate by revealing their true preferences
to the mechanism. In an environment with several auctions
running simultaneously or sequentially, truthfulness of each
individual auction loses its appeal, as the global mechanism
is no longer truthful, even if each individual part is. The
literature’s focus on truthful mechanisms is based on the
revelation principle, showing that if there are better non-
truthful solutions, the mechanism designer can run this al-
ternate solution on the players’ behalf. However, the revela-
tion principle is limited to mechanisms running in isolation:
with multiple mechanisms run by different parties, there is
no global coordinator to implement the solution. Requiring
global coordination between mechanisms is not viable and
could lead to complicated coordination problems, such as
agreeing on ways to divide up the global revenue.
The online market setting introduces new desiderata for
designing mechanisms. Typical mechanisms used in practice
are extremely simple, and not truthful. The Internet envi-
ronment allows for running millions of auctions, which neces-
sitates the use of very simple and intuitive auction schemes.
Second, we cannot assume that the designer knows all pa-
rameters of the environment at the design phase. Most
mechanisms in online markets run in a dynamic environ-
ment and constantly adapting the mechanism is infeasible.
Third, participants of such a dynamic and complex setting
are bound to use learning strategies. Therefore, a mecha-
nism should have good properties even under learning be-
havior. Last, we cannot expect the participants to know all
the parameters of the game (e.g. valuations of opponents).
Therefore, the mechanism should also be robust with respect
to informational assumptions and should be approximately
efficient, independent of the distribution of valuations.
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Our Results.
We define the notion of a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism and
show that smooth mechanisms possess all the aforementioned
desired properties of composability and robustness under
learning behavior and incomplete information. If a mech-
anism has the property that in any outcome, any partici-
pant can change her bid to receive her allocation of choice
by paying the price paid at the current outcome, then the
equilibrium outcome and prices are market clearing, imply-
ing that the outcome is socially optimal. Smooth mecha-
nisms satisfy an approximate analog of this, requiring the
property only in aggregate and only approximately (both
in the value of the outcome achieved by the deviating bid
and in the price paid), but not allowing the deviating bid to
depend on the current actions of other players; a property
crucial for the efficiency results described next. Our notion
of smoothness is focused on mechanisms where players have
quasilinear utilities and is related to the notion of smooth
games introduced by Roughgarden [27].
Smooth Mechanisms and Efficiency. We show that
a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism achieves at least a λ
max(1,µ)
frac-
tion of the maximum possible social welfare in the full in-
formation setting. This is true in all correlated equilibria of
the game and thereby no-internal-regret learning outcomes
[4]. We show that this result extends to the Bayesian set-
ting with uncertainty about participants. This extension
theorem strengthens the results of Roughgarden [28] and
Syrgkanis [31] who showed a similar extension theorem re-
quiring a complex smoothness condition involving multiple
types which additionally couldn’t capture sequential games.
Our proof uses a bluffing technique to handle the fact that we
allow the deviating action to depend on the previous action
of the deviating player (needed for sequential composition).
Complement-Free Valuations. We develop an hierar-
chy of valuations on outcomes of different mechanisms. Ex-
isting valuation hierarchies consider only valuations on sets
of items. We identify analogs of complement-free valuations
across mechanisms, without making any assumption about
the valuations of players’ for outcomes within a mechanism.
We define natural generalizations of fractionally subaddi-
tive and XOS valuations and show that these two classes
are equivalent extending the result of Feige [10].
Composability of Smooth Mechanisms. We show
that smooth mechanisms compose well in parallel: if we
run any number of (λ, µ)-smooth mechanisms simultane-
ously and players have fractionally subadditive valuations
over outcomes of different mechanisms, then the global game
is also a (λ,µ)-smooth mechanism, and hence achieves a
λ/max(1, µ) fraction of the maximum social welfare in all
correlated equilibria of the full information setting and in all
mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria in the Bayesian setting.
We also show that smooth mechanisms compose well se-
quentially: if we run any number of (λ, µ)-smooth mech-
anisms sequentially and a player’s value is the maximum
valued allocation she got among all mechanisms then the
global game is also (λ, µ + 1)-smooth and thereby achieves
a λ/(µ+ 1) fraction of the optimal social welfare.
Applications. We show that many well-known auctions
are smooth and can be analyzed in our framework. We list a
few representative examples below, and note that our com-
position result applies when running any set of such auctions
simultaneously or sequentially.
• We show that the first price auction is (1 − 1/e, 1)-
smooth implying an efficiency bound of approximately
1.58 for simultaneous first price item auctions, improv-
ing the bound of Hassidim et al [15] and matching [31].
• All-pay auctions, and a simple first price position auc-
tion are (1/2, 1)-smooth, implying a bound of 2.
• The first price greedy combinatorial auction of Lucier
and Borodin [20] based on a c-approximation algorithm
is (1− e−1/c, c)-smooth, improving the efficiency bound
of [20] from c+O(log(c)) to c+ 0.58.
• The bandwidth allocation game of Johari and Tsitsiklis
[17] is (2−√3, 1)-smooth, proving a somewhat weaker
efficiency bound than [17], but extending the bound also
to Bayesian games and learning outcomes.
No-overbidding. For some mechanisms, such as the sec-
ond price auction, good performance requires that bidders
do not bid above their value. For such mechanisms, we iden-
tify the notion of a weakly smooth mechanism. Roughly
speaking, we will require that bidders’ declared maximum
willingness to pay doesn’t exceed their valuation, and add
a term to the smoothness definition using the participants
maximum willingness to pay. As in the case of smooth mech-
anism, weakly smooth mechanisms remain weakly smooth
when composed, and have high quality outcome in equilib-
rium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information
setting, in learning outcomes, and in the Bayesian setting.
Budget Constraints. The results discussed so far, as-
sume that participants have quasi-linear valuations. The
most common valuation that is not quasi-linear is when
players have budget constraints. We extend our results to
settings where participants have budget constraints. With
budget constraints, maximizing welfare is not an achievable
goal, as we cannot expect a low budget participant to be ef-
fective at maximizing her contribution to welfare. Instead,
we consider the optimal “effective welfare” benchmark; cap-
ping the contribution of each player to the welfare by their
budget. We show that all our results about efficiency for the
case of simultaneous mechanisms carry over to bounds for
this benchmark when players have budget constraints.
Related Work.
There has been a long line of research on quantifying ineffi-
ciency of equilibria starting from Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou [18] who introduced the notion of the price of anarchy.
More recently, this analysis technique has also been used to
quantify the inefficiency of auction games, including games
of incomplete information. A series of papers, Bikhchandani
[3], Christodoulou et al [6], Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2],
Hassidim et al [15], Paes Leme et al [25], Syrgkanis and Tar-
dos [32] studied the efficiency of equilibria of non-truthful
combinatorial auctions that are based on running separate
item auctions (simultaneously or sequentially) for each item.
Lucier and Borodin [20] studied Bayes-Nash Equilibria of
non-truthful auctions based on greedy allocation algorithms.
Caragiannis et al [5] studied the inefficiency of Bayes-Nash
equilibria of the generalized second price auction. All this
literature can be thought of as special cases of our framework
and all the proofs can be understood as smoothness proofs
giving the same or even tighter results. A recent exception
is the paper by Feldman et al. [11] giving a tighter bound for
simultaneous item-auctions with subadditive bidders, than
what would follow from smoothness.
Roughgarden [27] proposed a framework, which he calls
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smoothness in games, and showed that a number of classical
price of anarchy results (such as routing and valid utility
games) can be proved using this framework. Further, he
showed that such efficiency proofs carry over to efficiency of
coarse correlated equilibria (no-regret learning outcomes).
Nadav and Roughgarden [24] give the broadest solution con-
cept for which smoothness proofs apply. Schoppmann and
Roughgarden [29] extend the framework to games with con-
tinuous strategy spaces, providing tighter results. However,
these papers consider only the full information setting and
do not capture several of the auctions described previously.
Our definition of a smooth mechanism is closely related to
the notion of a smooth game. If utilities of the game were al-
ways non-negative (which is not the case here) then a (λ, µ)-
smooth mechanism can be thought of as a (λ, µ−1)-smooth
game, but with much weaker requirements, allowing us to
capture all the auctions above, as well as sequential compo-
sition.
Recent papers offer extensions of the smoothness frame-
work to incomplete information games. Lucier and Paes
Leme [21] introduced the concept of semi-smoothness (in-
spired by their GSP analysis), and showed that efficiency
results shown via semi-smoothness extend to the incomplete
information version of the game, even if the types of the play-
ers are arbitrarily correlated. However, semi-smoothness is
a much more restrictive property (for instance, not satisfied
by the item-bidding auctions) than just requiring that every
complete information instance of the game is smooth. Re-
cently Roughgarden [28] (and independently Syrgkanis [31])
offered a more general such extension theorem. They show
that one can prove bounds on the price of anarchy of an in-
complete information game (assuming type distributions of
players are independent) by restricting attention to induced
complete information instances and proving a stronger ver-
sion of the smoothness property, which [31] calls universal
smoothness. Our extension theorem is based on simply as-
suming that for any choice of valuations, the induced full
information game is smooth according to the standard def-
inition of smoothness. In contrast, the stronger universal
smoothness property relates utilities of players with differ-
ent types in a single inequality. While, many of the known
examples satisfy this stronger notion of smoothness, our ex-
tension theorem is more natural, assuming only that the un-
derlying full information game is smooth, and does not mix
player types. In addition, our smoothness is an even weaker
property that allows us to capture efficiency in sequential
games of incomplete information in a unified framework.
A recent survey by Pai [26] highlights settings where dif-
ferent sellers compete by announcing mechanisms, starting
from the seminal work of McAfee [23] and focusing on rev-
enue maximization. Our work is in the same spirit, and aims
to analyze the effect of such competition on social welfare.
2. COMPOSITION FRAMEWORK
We will consider a setting where players participate in a
set of mechanisms. We assume that players’ preferences are
quasilinear in money. In this section we introduce our frame-
work and set up the notation we need for defining mecha-
nisms and compositions of mechanisms.
Mechanism with Quasilinear Preferences. A mech-
anism design setting consists of a set of n players and a set
of outcomes X ⊆ ×iXi, where Xi is the set of allocations
for player i. Each player has a valuation vi : Xi → R+ over
allocations. Let Vi be the set of possible valuations of player
i. Given an allocation xi ∈ Xi and a payment pi ∈ R+, we
assume that the utility of player i is:
uvii (xi, pi) = vi(xi)− pi (1)
Observe that although we assume that the outcome space
is in the form of a subset of a product space, this doesn’t
restrict at all the space of mechanism design settings we can
model, since we don’t put any restriction on the structure of
the subset of the product space. Hence, our model captures
a range of problems, including games where players have ex-
ternalities or share a single outcome. A few of the special
cases are: 1) combinatorial auctions where Xi is the power
set of items and X is the subset of this product space such
that no item is assigned to more than one player, 2) combi-
natorial public projects where Xi is the power set of projects
and X is the subset of the product space such that every
coordinate is the same, 3) position auctions where Xi is the
set of positions and X is the subset of the product space
where no two coordinates are assigned the same position, 4)
bandwidth allocation mechanisms where Xi is the portion of
the bandwidth assigned to player i and X is the subset such
that the sum of the coordinates is at most the bandwidth
capacity. Using this product space formulation allows us to
encode which part of the outcome the valuation of a player
is affected by and it facilitates the formulation of valuation
classes on outcome spaces as we will see in the next section.
Given a valuation space V = ×iVi and an outcome space
X , a mechanism M is a triple (A, X, P ), where A = ×iAi
is a set of actions Ai for each player i, X : A → X is an
allocation function that takes an action profile a and maps
it to an outcome x and P : A → Rn+ is a payment function
that takes an action profile and maps it into a payment Pi
for each player.
We will only consider settings where each player has the
option to not participate, and hence at any rational outcome
gets non-negative utility in expectation over the information
she doesn’t have and over the randomness of the other play-
ers and the mechanisms.
The Composition Framework. Mechanisms rarely run
in isolation but rather, several mechanisms take place simul-
taneously and/or sequentially, and players typically have
valuations that are complex functions on the outcomes of
different mechanisms.
We consider the following general setting: there are n
bidders and m mechanisms. Each mechanism Mj has its
own outcome space X j and consists of a triple (Aj , Xj , P j)
as described previously, i.e. Aj = ×iAji is the action space,
Xj : Aj → X j is the allocation function and P j : Aj → Rn+
the payment function.
We assume that a player has a valuation over vectors of
outcomes from the different mechanisms: vi : Xi → R+
where Xi = ×jX ji . A player’s utility is still quasi-linear
in this extended setting in the sense that his utility from
an allocation vector xi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
m
i ) and payment vector
pi = (p
1
i , . . . , p
m
i ) is given by:
uvii (xi, pi) = vi(x
1
i , . . . , x
m
i )−
∑m
j=1 p
j
i (2)
We will consider both simultaneous and sequential compo-
sition of mechanisms. In the case of simultaneous composi-
tion, a player’s strategy space is to report an action aji at
each mechanism j. In the case of sequential composition a
player can base the action she submits at mechanism j on
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the history of the submitted action profiles in previous mech-
anisms (alternatively we could assume that bidders observe
only allocations and payments in previous mechanisms; our
results are robust to such information assumptions).
The simultaneous composition of mechanisms can be viewed
as a global mechanism M = (A, X, P ), where Ai = ×jAji ,
X = ×jX j , X(a) = (Xj(aj))j and P (a) =
∑
j P
j(aj). Se-
quential composition can also be viewed as a global mecha-
nism with a more complex action space, where actions are
functions of the observed history of play in earlier mecha-
nisms. Our goal is to give properties of the individual mech-
anisms that guarantee efficiency of the global mechanism.
Efficiency Measure. We will measure efficiency of an
action profile a in terms of social welfare
SW v(a) =
∑
i vi(Xi(a)) (3)
which is the sum of the utilities of all players and the rev-
enue of all the mechanisms. For any valuation profile v ∈
×iVi there exists an optimal allocation x∗(v) that maximizes∑
i vi(xi) over all allocations x ∈ X and we will denote with
Opt(v) =
∑
i vi(x
∗
i (v)) (4)
3. HIERARCHY OF VALUATIONS
In order to to infer good properties of the global mech-
anism from properties of individual mechanisms, we will
need to assume that player valuations have no complements
across outcomes of different mechanisms. When each mech-
anism is a single item auction, this is captured by well-
understood assumptions on valuations, such as subadditive,
fractionally subadditive, submodular, etc. Here we will ex-
tend these definitions to the case when the component mech-
anisms have arbitrary possible outcomes, without making
any assumptions on valuations within each mechanism. Since
we focus on the valuation of a specific player i, for notational
simplicity we will drop the index i in the current section. We
define classes of complement free valuations v : X → R+ on
a product space of allocations X = ×jXj . In a composition
setting, Xj is the set of possible allocations to player i from
mechanism Mj .
The class of valuations that will be important in our com-
posability theorems is that of fractionally subadditive valu-
ations across mechanisms, which we define as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Fractionally Subadditive) A valuation
is fractionally subadditive across mechanisms if
v(x) ≤∑ℓ αℓv(yℓ)
whenever each coordinate xj is covered in the set of solutions
yℓ, that is
∑
ℓ:xj=y
ℓ
j
αℓ ≥ 1. It is β-fractionally subadditive
if v(x) ≤ β∑ℓ αℓv(yℓ) under the same condition.
The above is the natural extension of the class of fraction-
ally subadditive valuations that has been defined only for
valuations defined on sets (i.e. special case of Xj ∈ {0, 1}).
In the context of set valuations it has been shown that frac-
tionally subadditive valuations is equivalent to the class of
XOS valuations. We give here the natural generalization
of XOS valuations in our setting and then we show that the
analogous equivalence theorem still holds, thereby extending
the result of Feige [10]. We defer the proof to the Appendix.
Definition 3.2 (XOS) A valuation is XOS if there exist
a set L of additive valuations vℓj(xj), such that: v(x) =
maxℓ∈L
∑
j v
ℓ
j(xj). It is β-XOS if:
maxℓ∈L
∑
j v
ℓ
j(xj) ≤ v(x) ≤ βmaxℓ∈L
∑
j v
ℓ
j(xj)
Theorem 3.3 (XOS≡ Fractionally Subadditive) A val-
uation is fractionally subadditive over the outcomes of dif-
ferent mechanisms if and only if it is XOS. Similarly, it is
β-fractionally subadditive if and only if it is β-XOS.
Subclasses of Valuations.
To define generalizations of submodular and subadditive
valuations, we will assume that each mechanism has a player-
specific empty outcome ⊥j ∈ Xj , which intuitively corre-
sponds to: ”the mechanism is not existent for player i”.
These outcomes don’t affect the way the mechanism works
(e.g. we don’t impose that these outcomes be picked by the
mechanism for some strategy profile) but it just serves as a
reference point for the valuations of the bidders: we assume
that v(⊥1, . . . ,⊥m) = 0. We will also use the notation xS
to denote the outcome vector that is xj for all j ∈ S and ⊥j
otherwise. We start with the generalization of subadditivity
of set valuations:
Definition 3.4 A valuation is set-subadditive if and only
if for any two sets S1, S2 ⊆ [m] and any x ∈ X :
v (xS1) + v (xS2) ≥ v (xS1∪S2)
In addition we define the notion of set-submodularity which
extends submodularity of set valuations as follows: the marginal
benefit from receiving an allocation xj at some mechanism
Mj decreases as the set of mechanisms from which the agent
has received a non-empty allocation becomes larger.
Definition 3.5 A valuation is set-submodular if and only
if, for any x ∈ X and for any two sets S ⊆ T ⊆ [m]:
v
(
xS+{j}
)− v (xS) ≥ v (xT+{j})− v (xT )
Last, we will make the intuitive assumption that if a player
wins a non-empty allocation in more mechanisms then his
valuation increases: a valuation is set-monotone if for any
two sets S ⊆ T : v (xS) ≤ v (xT ). We show that the relation
between these classes of valuations mirrors the relations of
the analogous classes for traditional valuations.
Theorem 3.6 (Set-Submodular ⊆ XOS) If a valuation
is set - monotone and set-submodular then it is XOS.
Theorem 3.7 (Set-Subadditive ⊆ Hm-XOS) If a valu-
ation is set-monotone and set-subadditive then it is Hm-
XOS, where Hm is the m-th harmonic number.
Restricted Classes of Valuations.
In some applications we want to consider restricted sub-
classes of valuations that are natural in the context. For such
applications, we want to prove a strengthening of Theorem
3.3 where if the valuation v(x) comes from some class, the
component valuations vℓj : Xj → R+ used in the equivalent
XOS valuation also come from this class.
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In the proof of Theorem 3.3 it is shown that any fraction-
ally subadditive valuation can be expressed as an XOS val-
uation where each induced valuation vℓj is a single-minded
valuation (i.e. vℓj(xj) = c if xj = xˆj and 0 otherwise).
However, single-minded valuations might not be natural in
some applications. For example, if the outcome space of
a component mechanism is ordered or is a lattice, then it
is appropriate to consider only induced valuations that are
monotone, or submodular on the lattice. We provide two
such strengthenings of Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.8 If a valuation is monotone with respect to a
coordinate-wise partial order = (j)j and β-fractionally
subadditive then it can be expressed as a β-XOS valuation
such that each induced valuation vℓj : Xj → R+ is monotone
with respect to j.
If each poset (Xj ,j) forms a lattice then it is natural to
consider valuations that have diminishing marginal returns
over this lattice: i.e. for any z  y and t ∈ X
v(t ∨ y)− v(y) ≥ v(t ∨ z)− v(z)
If the lattice is distributive and the valuation is monotone
then the above class of valuations is equivalent to the class of
submodular valuations over the lattice (proof in Appendix).
Theorem 3.9 If a valuation is monotone and satisfies the
diminishing marginal returns property with respect to a dis-
tributive product lattice (X ,) then it can be expressed as
an XOS valuation using valuations vℓj : Xj → R+ that are
capped marginal valuations:
vℓj(xj) = v(xj ∧ xˆj , xˆ−j)− v(⊥j , xˆ−j)
(for some xˆ ∈ X associated with each ℓ) and satisfy the di-
minishing marginal returns property with respect to (Xj ,j).
4. SMOOTH MECHANISMS
In this section we introduce the notion of a smooth mecha-
nism for settings where agents have quasi-linear preferences.
Our notion is similar to the smoothness of games of Rough-
garden [27], but is tailored to the setting of mechanisms
where participants have quasilinear preferences.
Definition 4.1 (Smooth Mechanism) A mechanism M
is (λ, µ)-smooth if for any valuation profile v ∈ ×iVi and
for any action profile a there exists a randomized action
a∗i (v, ai) for each player i, s.t.:∑
i u
vi
i (a
∗
i (v, ai), a−i) ≥ λOpt(v)− µ
∑
i Pi(a) (5)
for some λ, µ ≥ 0. We denote by uvii (a) the expected utility
of a player if a is a vector of randomized strategies.
The definition of a smooth mechanism has a very natural in-
terpretation as guaranteeing an approximate analog of mar-
ket cleaning prices. Bikhchandani [3] showed that pure Nash
equilibria of a simultaneous first price auction have market
clearing prices, and this implies that the outcome is efficient.
Aggregate market clearing prices are guaranteed when each
participant can modify her bid to claim her optimal bun-
dle at the price paid for this bundle in the current solution.
(1, 1)-smoothness in essence requires this property only in
aggregate, but for any outcome of the mechanism, not only
at equilibrium. While (λ,µ)-smoothness requires this only
approximately, both in terms of the bundle claimed, as well
as the price paid for it. In addition, unlike the pure equilib-
rium analysis, it requires the modified bid to be ignorant of
the actions of the rest of the players.
We show that smooth mechanisms have low price of anar-
chy and that this result extends to all correlated equilibria
(and hence learning outcomes) in the complete information
setting and to all Bayes-Nash equilibria in the incomplete
information setting without any change in the assumption.
Theorem 4.2 If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth and players
have the possibility to withdraw from the mechanism then the
expected social welfare at any Correlated Equilibrium of the
game is at least λ
max{µ,1} of the optimal social welfare.
Proof sketch. We prove the theorem for the case of a
Pure Nash Equilibrium a. Since players have quasi-linear
utilities we have: vi(Xi(a)) = ui(a) + Pi(a). Using that no
player wants to deviate to a∗i (v, ai) we get:∑
i vi(Xi(a)) ≥
∑
i ui(a
∗
i (v, ai), a−i) +
∑
i Pi(a)
≥ λOpt(v) + (1− µ)∑i Pi(a)
The result follows if µ ≤ 1. When µ > 1, to get the result, we
note that vi(Xi(a)) ≥ Pi(a), as players have the possibility
to withdraw from the mechanism and get 0 utility.
Our notion of smoothness of a mechanism differs from
Roughgarden’s notion of smoothness of games. To think of
a mechanism as a game, we will consider the mechanism also
as a player, with utility
∑
i Pi(a) and no strategic decision
to make. Our definition of a (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism, is
closely related to the game being (λ,µ − 1)-smooth in the
sense of [27], with two differences. We dropped the term
−(µ− 1)∑i uvii (a) on the right hand side, to make the defi-
nition more natural in the context of mechanisms. Note that
this change makes the definitions incomparable, as with an
arbitrary action profile a, the player utilities uvii (a) can be
negative. Second, we allow the deviating strategy a∗i (v, ai)
to depend both on the valuation vector v and the strategy of
the deviating player i. This difference causes our Theorem
4.2 to only hold for correlated equilibria, and not coarse cor-
related equilibria. Allowing the deviating strategy to depend
on ai makes it possible to prove a composability theorem for
sequential mechanisms, where it is important to allow the
deviating player to “wait for the right moment” to deviate.
In games where the deviation required by smoothness does
not depend on ai, our results extend to coarse correlated
equilibria. We focus on the version that allows this depen-
dence so as to capture sequential composition. Simultaneous
composition works well with either version of the definition.
Incomplete Information Setting. Next we consider
the case where the valuation of each player is drawn from
a distribution Fi over his valuation space Vi. These dis-
tributions are independent and are common knowledge. A
mechanism M = (A, X, P ) now defines a game of incom-
plete information. The strategy of each player is a func-
tion si : Vi → Ai. We will use s(v) = (si(vi))i∈N to de-
note the vector of actions given a valuation profile v and
s−i(v−i) = (sj(vj))j 6=i to denote the vector of actions for all
players except i.
The dominant solution concept in incomplete information
games is the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE). A Bayes-Nash
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Equilibrium is a strategy profile (possibly randomized) such
that each player maximizes his expected utility conditional
on his private information.
∀ai ∈ Ai : Ev−i|vi [uvii (s(v))] ≥ Ev−i|vi [uvii (ai, s−i(v−i)]
Given a strategy profile s : ×iVi → ×iAi, our measure of
efficiency will be the expected social welfare over the val-
uations of the players: Ev [SW
v(s(v))]. We will compare
the efficiency of our solution concepts with respect to the
expected optimal social welfare: Ev [Opt(v)].
Extension Theorem. The main result of this section
is to show that if a mechanism is smooth according to def-
inition 4.1 then it achieves a good fraction of the expected
optimal social welfare at every Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
the incomplete information game, irrespective of the distri-
butions of valuations. In the appendix we extend this result
to general normal form games, strengthening the result of
Roughgarden [28] and Syrgkanis [31] where a strengthened
notion of smoothness (universal smoothness) was used to es-
tablish efficiency results in the incomplete information set-
ting. In addition, the previous definitions of smoothness in
normal form games did not allow the deviating strategy to
depend on the previous action of the deviating player and
thereby wouldn’t allow us to capture sequential games.
Note that the deviating strategy a∗i (v, ai) of player i re-
quired by the smoothness property depends on the whole
valuation profile v and not only on the valuation of player
i. As a result a∗i (v, ai) cannot be directly used as deviation
for the player in the incomplete information game, as she is
not aware of the valuations v−i. We use random sampling
to handle the dependence on the values of other players, and
a bluffing technique to handle the dependence on the action
of the deviating player.
Theorem 4.3 If a mechanismM is (λ, µ)-smooth and play-
ers have the possibility to withdraw, then for any set of in-
dependent distributions Fi, every mixed Bayes-Nash Equilib-
rium of the game induced by M has expected social welfare
at least λ
max{µ,1} of the expected optimal social welfare.
Proof. We will prove it for the case of a pure Bayes-
Nash equilibrium s(v) (the generalization to mixed equilib-
ria is straightforward). Consider the following randomized
deviation for each player i that depends only on the infor-
mation that he has which is his own value vi and the equi-
librium strategies s(·): He random samples a valuation pro-
file w ∼ ×iFi. Then he plays a∗i ((vi, w−i), si(wi)), i.e., the
player considers the equilibrium actions s(w), using the ran-
domly sampled type (including the random sample of his
own type), and deviates from this action profile using the
action given by the smoothness property for his true type
vi, the random sample of the types of the others w−i, and
the equilibrium action si(wi) of his randomly sampled type
wi. Using the action si(wi) as the base, corresponds to a
bluffing technique that was introduced in [31] in the context
of sequential first price auctions, where player i “pretends”
that his valuation was wi until he deviates.
Since this is not a profitable deviation for player i:
Ev [u
vi
i (s(v))] ≥ Ev,w [uvii (a∗i ((vi, w−i), si(wi)), s−i(v−i)]
= Ev,w [u
wi
i (a
∗
i ((wi, w−i), si(vi)), s−i(v−i))]
= Ev,w [u
wi
i (a
∗
i (w, si(vi)), s−i(v−i))]
Summing over players and using the smoothness property:
Ev
[∑
i u
vi
i (s(v))
] ≥ Ev,w [∑i uwii (a∗i (w, si(vi)), s−i(v−i))]
≥ Ev,w
[
λOpt(w)− µ∑i Pi(s(v))]
= λEw [Opt(w)]− µEv
[∑
i Pi(s(v))
]
By quasi-linearity of utility and using the fact that players
have the possibility to withdraw from the mechanism, we
have the result.
5. COMPOSITION THEOREMS
Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms. For si-
multaneous composability of mechanisms we require that
each mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth, and that the valuation is
fractionally subadditive over outcomes of mechanisms. To
state the result more generally, recall that Theorem 3.3 im-
plies that the valuation is also XOS.
Theorem 5.1 (Simultaneous Composition) Consider the
simultaneous composition of m mechanisms. Suppose that
each mechanism Mj is (λ, µ)-smooth when the mechanism
restricted valuations of the players come from a class (Vji )i∈[n].
If the valuation vi : Xi → R+ of each player across mecha-
nisms is fractionally subadditive, and can be expressed as an
XOS valuation by component valuations vℓij ∈ Vji then the
global mechanism is also (λ, µ)-smooth.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and an action pro-
file a. Let x∗ be the optimal allocation for type profile v. Let
v∗ij be the representative additive valuation for player i for x
∗
i
as implied by the definition of XOS valuations, i.e. vi(x
∗
i ) =∑
j v
∗
ij(x
∗
ij) and for all xi ∈ Xi: vi(xi) ≥
∑
j v
∗
ij(x
j
i ).
To prove the theorem we will show that there exists a
deviation a∗i = a
∗
i (v, ai) of the global mechanism such that:∑
i u
vi
i (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ λ
∑
i vi(x
∗
i )− µ
∑
i Pi(a)
To define such a deviation we use the fact that each mecha-
nismMj is (λ, µ)-smooth. Suppose that we run mechanism
Mj and each player has valuation v∗ij on X ji and let v∗j be
this valuation profile. Since, by assumption those valuations
fall in the valuation space Vji for which smoothness of Mj
holds, for any action profile aj there exists a randomized
action a∗ij = a
∗
ij(v
∗
j , a
j
i ) for each player, such that the sum
of the utilities of the agents when each agent unilaterally
deviates to it, is at least λ
∑
i v
∗
ij(x
∗
ij)− µ
∑
i P
j
i (a
j).
For the global mechanism, we consider a randomized de-
viation a∗i = a
∗
i (v, ai) of player i that consists of indepen-
dent randomized deviations a∗ij = a
∗
ij(v
∗
j , a
j
i ) for each mech-
anism j as described in the previous paragraph. For each
action a∗i in the support of a
∗
i we denote with Xi(a
∗
i , a−i)
the outcome vector in that action profile. By the proper-
ties of the representative additive valuation, we have that
vi(Xi(a
∗
i , a−i)) ≥
∑
j v
∗
ij(X
j
i (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i)). Thus the expected
utility of player i from the deviation will be at least:
uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ Ea∗i
[∑
j v
∗
ij
(
Xji (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i)
)− P ji (a∗ij , aj−i)]
Now adding over all players i we have:∑
i u
vi
i (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
j,i Ea
∗
ij
[
v∗ij(X
j
i (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i))− P ji (a∗ij , aj−i)
]
The key argument is that∑
i Ea
∗
ij
[
v∗ij(X
j
i (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i))− P ji (a∗ij , aj−i)
]
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is the sum of the expected utilities where starting from strat-
egy profile aj each player i unilaterally deviates to a random-
ized bid a∗ij = a
∗
ij(v
∗
j , a
j
i ) in mechanism Mj and when each
player i has valuation v∗ij for the different outcomes x
j
i of
mechanism Mj . By smoothness of each mechanism Mj :∑
i u
vi
i (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
j
(
λ
∑
i v
∗
ij(x
∗
ij)− µ
∑
i P
j
i (a
j)
)
= λ
∑
i
∑
j v
∗
ij(x
∗
ij)− µ
∑
i
∑
j P
j
i (a
j)
= λ
∑
i vi(x
∗
i )− µ
∑
i Pi(a)
where we used that by the definition of the representative
additive valuation vi(x
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈[m] v
∗
ij(x
∗
ij).
In Sections 6 and 9 we will give a number of applications of
this result. Note that if the classes Vji contain single-minded
valuations (e.g. in the case of combinatorial auctions), then
our composability theorem holds for any fractionally subad-
ditive valuation. For classes of valuations that do not con-
tain single-minded valuations (such as ad-auctions), we can
apply the theorem using results from Section 3 on monotone
and lattice-submodular valuations.
Sequential Composition of Mechanisms. In many
scenarios, mechanisms might not all take place simultane-
ously. Sequentiality however can lead to inefficiencies as
was shown by recent works on sequential auctions [25, 31].
Here, we show that the positive results of [25, 31] on unit-
demand sequential first price auctions are a special case of
a more general property of smooth mechanisms. For the se-
quential composition of m mechanisms we prove that if each
mechanism Mj is (λ,µ)-smooth, then the resulting mecha-
nism is (λ, µ + 1)-smooth (for the normal form representa-
tion of the extensive form of game) if an agents valuation
is the best of her valuation over the different mechanisms:
vi(xi) = maxj∈[m] v
j
i (x
j
i ).
An interesting aspect of the sequential composition is that
the strategy of a player is no longer just an action aji ∈ Aji for
each mechanism but rather a whole contingency plan of what
action she will submit to mechanismMj conditional on any
observed history of play. Our result doesn’t depend on what
part of the history is observed by the players, whether play-
ers just observe their own allocation, or all allocations, or
also all prices, or bids. We don’t even need that all play-
ers observe the same things. However, we assume that the
information structure is common knowledge.
Theorem 5.2 (Sequential Composition) Consider the se-
quential composition of m, (λ, µ)-smooth, mechanisms de-
fined on valuation spaces Vji . If each valuation vi : Xi → R+
of is of the form vi(xi) = maxj∈[m] v
j
i (x
j
i ), with v
j
i ∈ Vji ,
then the global mechanism is (λ, µ+1)-smooth, independent
of the information released to players during the sequential
rounds.
We can combine these two theorems to prove efficiency
guarantees when mechanisms are run in a sequence of rounds
and at each round several mechanisms are run simultane-
ously.
6. AN APPLICATION: ITEM AUCTIONS
In this section we present a simple, yet rich, application of
our framework to the case where each component mechanism
is a single-item auction. We consider the three main single-
item auctions: first-price, all-pay and second-price.
First Price Auction. The first price auction is a (1 −
1/e, 1)-smooth mechanism. To see the smoothness note that
under any valuation profile v (note that we only need to ar-
gue about the full information setting), the highest value
player with value vh can deviate to submitting a random-
ized bid b′h drawn from a distribution with density function
f(x) = 1
vh−x and support [0, (1 − 1/e)vh], while all non-
highest value players should just deviate to bidding 0. No
matter what the rest of the players are bidding, the utility
of the highest bidder from the deviation is:
uvhh (b
′
h, b−h) ≥
∫ (1− 1e )vh
maxi6=h bi
(vh − x)f(x)dx
≥ (1− 1
e
)
vh −maxi bi
Theorem 5.1 now implies that if we run m simultaneous
first price auctions and bidders have fractionally subaddi-
tive valuations then any Correlated Equilibrium in the full
information setting and any mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
in the incomplete information setting has social welfare at
least (1− 1
e
) of the optimal. A looser result of 1/4 for this set-
ting and only for mixed Nash and Bayes-Nash appeared in
[15]. The tighter result of (1− 1
e
) appeared in [31]. Theorem
5.2 implies that if we run m first price auctions sequentially
and bidders have unit-demand valuations then any Corre-
lated Equilibrium in the full information setting and any
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in the incomplete information set-
ting has social welfare at least 1
2
(1− 1
e
) of the optimal. The
latter result was given in a sequence of two papers [25, 31].
All-Pay Auction. The all-pay auction is a (1/2, 1)-
smooth mechanism. The smoothness proof is similar to the
first price auction with the only alteration that we make
the highest value player submit a bid drawn uniformly at
random from [0, vh]. The utility from such a deviation is:
uvhh (b
′
h, b−h) ≥
∫ vh
maxi6=h bi
vhf(x)dx− E[b′h]
≥ 1
2
vh −maxi bi ≥ 12vh −
∑
i bi
Therefore we get an efficiency guarantee of 1/2 for the simul-
taneous composition of m all-pay auctions and an efficiency
guarantee of 1/4 for the sequential composition both in the
Bayesian setting and in learning outcomes. Simultaneous
and sequential all-pay auctions have not been studied in the
literature and could prove useful in capturing simultaneous
or sequential all-pay contests, which is a natural model for
several online crowd-sourcing environments.
Second-Price Auction. The second price auction is not
a smooth mechanism. In fact, the second price auction is not
as robust as the previous auctions. Second price auctions
have arbitrary bad equilibria when players bid above their
value, Goeree [14] shows that signaling is bound to arise in
a second price auction when bidders are strategising about
future opportunities, and Paes Leme et al [25] show an exam-
ple with unbounded inefficiency when running second price
auctions sequentially and bidders are unit-demand. The
main difference of the second price auction and the previous
two auctions is that it makes very loose connection between
the bid a player needs to make to win and the price that
was previously paid to the auctioneer. Several papers [6,
2, 22, 5] have used an assumption that players will not bid
above their valuations to give good efficiency guarantees for
second-price type of auctions. Next, we extend our results to
mechanisms that require such no-overbidding assumptions.
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7. WEAK SMOOTHNESS
In this section we give a generalization of our framework
to capture mechanisms that produce high efficiency under a
no-overbidding refinement. First, we give a definition of no-
overbidding that generalizes the no-overbidding assumptions
used in the literature [6, 2, 5]. In a single-item second-price
auction the bid of a player is his maximum willingness to pay
when he wins. The following defines maximum willingness
to pay in the general mechanism design setting.
Definition 7.1 (Willingness-to-pay) Given a mechanism
(A, X, P ) a player’s maximum willingness-to-pay for an al-
location xi when using strategy ai is defined as the maximum
he could ever pay conditional on allocation xi:
Bi(ai, xi) = maxa−i: Xi(a)=xi Pi(a) (6)
Definition 7.2 (Weakly Smooth Mechanism) A mech-
anism is weakly (λ,µ1, µ2)-smooth for λ, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0, if for
any type profile v ∈ ×iVi and for any action profile a there
exists a randomized action a∗i (v, ai) for each player i, s.t.:∑
i u
vi
i (a
∗
i (v, ai), a−i) ≥ λOpt(v)− µ1
∑
i Pi(a)
− µ2
∑
iBi(ai, Xi(a))
Definition 7.3 (No-overbidding) A randomized strategy
profile a satisfies the no-overbidding assumption if:
Ea[Bi(ai, Xi(a))] ≤ Ea[vi(Xi(a))] (7)
i.e., at this strategy profile no player is bidding in a way that
she could potentially pay more than her value subject to her
expected allocation remaining the same.
Theorem 7.4 If a mechanism is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth
then any Correlated Equilibrium in the full information set-
ting and any mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibrium in the Bayesian
setting that satisfies the no-overbidding assumption achieves
efficiency at least λ
µ2+max{µ1,1} of the expected optimal.
In the Appendix, we show, analogously to the results in Sec-
tion 5, that the simultaneous composition of weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-
smooth mechanisms is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth and the se-
quential composition is weakly (λ,µ1 + 1, µ2)-smooth.
Remark 1. In contrast to the smoothness used in [28]
our definition of smoothness allows us to prove efficiency
under the weaker assumption of no-overbidding in expecta-
tion, rather than point-wise no-overbidding. The main dif-
ference is that we incorporate the willingness-to-pay inside
the smoothness definition, while previous smoothness ap-
proaches would relate to value directly. The latter approach
would require to use point-wise no-overbidding to relate bids
to welfare in second-price auctions.
Remark 2. We use the non-overbidding assumption as
an equilibrium refinement rather than as a strategy-space
restriction. Several papers in the literature have used non-
overbidding as a strategy space restriction (rather than as
an equilibrium refinement). The two uses are equivalent in
settings where the restricted strategy space always contains
best-responses. Note that while overbidding is a dominated
strategy in a single item auction, global no-overbidding is
not dominated when running second price auctions simul-
taneously or sequentially. Overbidding equilibria that sur-
vive elimination of dominated strategies and that have non-
constant inefficiency have been given both for the case of
sequential [25] and simultaneous [11] second price auctions,
even in the simplest scenario when bidders are unit-demand.
Restricting the strategy space to non-overbidding strategies,
could potentially create artificial equilibria that were not
equilibria of the original game, since this restricted strategy
space does not always contain best-responses (see [11] for
an example). On the other hand, the refined set of non-
overbidding equilibria might be empty. Some of our results
carry over to the strategy-space restriction version and a
detailed exposition is deferred to the full version.
8. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
An important class of non-quasilinear preferences is when
players have hard budget constraints on the payments they
make. Studying the effect of budgets on efficiency has re-
ceived great attention in recent algorithmic game theory lit-
erature [7, 12, 13, 8] mostly in the realm of truthful mech-
anism design and assuming that the budgets are common
knowledge. Little is known about the effect of budgets in
the case of non-truthful mechanisms. For instance, only re-
cently Huang et al. [16] analyzed efficiency in a two-player
sequential first price auction game with budget constraints
in the complete information setting.
Most of the literature has focused on producing pareto-
optimal outcomes, i.e. a pair of allocation and prices such
that there is no other pair that respects feasibility and bud-
get constraints and such that all players receive strictly higher
utility and the auctioneer receives strictly higher revenue.
We study an orthogonal benchmark, which we call Effec-
tive Welfare, obtained by capping a player’s value by his
budget:
EW (x) =
∑
imin{vi(xi), Bi} (8)
We compare the social welfare resulting in our mechanism
to the maximum possible effective welfare. This benchmark
reflects that we cannot expect players with low budgets to
be effective at maximizing their own value.
We show that a lot of our results carry over to the effective
welfare benchmark, by introducing a strengthening of the
smoothness property of mechanisms; a strengthening that is
is satisfied by almost all the applications we consider. We
focus on smooth mechanisms, but all the results in this sec-
tion extend to weak smoothness assuming no-overbidding.
Definition 8.1 (Conservatively Smooth Mechanism)
A mechanism is conservatively (λ, µ)-smooth if it is (λ, µ)-
smooth in the quasilinear utility setting and the actions in
the support of the smoothness deviations satisfy:
maxa−i Pi(a
∗
i (v, ai), a−i) ≤ maxxi∈Xi vi(xi) (9)
The next theorem shows that the expected social wel-
fare at Correlated Equilibria and at Bayes-Nash equilibria
of conservatively smooth mechanisms is a good fraction of
the optimal effective welfare. Note that in the incomplete
information setting, the private information of a player is
his valuation and his budget. We will denote the valuation
and budget pair as the type ti = (vi, Bi) of player i and we
will assume that it is distributed independently according
to some distribution Fi on Vi ×R+. Note that we allow the
budget of a player to be correlated with his valuation.
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Theorem 8.2 If a mechanism is conservatively (λ, µ)-smooth
and its valuation space is closed under capping, then the so-
cial welfare at any correlated equilibrium and at any Bayes-
Nash equilibrium is at least λ
max{1,µ} of the expected maxi-
mum effective welfare.
Last we show that efficiency guarantees for budget-constraint
bidders are composable under the conservative smoothness
property for simultaneous composition. Unfortunately, se-
quential composition doesn’t carry over. In sequential mech-
anisms a good deviation may require that the player waits
and plays according to equilibrium until his optimal mecha-
nism arrives. While ”waiting” he might exhaust his budget.
Theorem 8.3 Consider the simultaneous composition of m
conservatively (λ, µ)-smooth mechanisms defined on valua-
tion spaces Vji that are closed under capping. If players have
XOS valuations and can be expressed by valuations vℓij ∈ Vji
then the social welfare at any correlated equilibrium and at
any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the global mechanism is at
least λ
max{1,µ} of the expected maximum effective welfare.
The composability result is proved in a sequence of two lem-
mas: first we prove that conservative smoothness of a mech-
anism composes under XOS valuations and second we show
that if the valuation space of each component mechanism is
closed under capping then the corresponding valuation space
of the composition mechanism is also closed under capping.
The latter is shown by proving a structural property of XOS
valuations: a valuation produced by capping an XOS valu-
ation is also XOS and can be described by component valu-
ations that are cappings of the component valuations of the
XOS representation of the initial valuation. Using these two
lemmas we can invoke Theorem 8.2 to get efficiency guaran-
tees for budget constrained bidders in the global mechanism.
9. APPLICATIONS
In this section we give several applications of our frame-
work. Some are new smoothness proofs implying new bounds
on efficiency, others are reinterpretations of existing litera-
ture as smoothness proofs. In each case adding budget con-
straints gives new results on efficiency of mechanisms, and
our results show that the efficiency is preserved by com-
position of mechanisms. The efficiency guarantees hold for
correlated equilibria in the full information setting and for
mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria in the incomplete information
setting. Our guarantees are with respect to the optimal ef-
fective welfare when the players have budget constraints.
Single Item Auctions. Extending the results of Section
6 we show that the first price single item auction is conser-
vatively
(
1− 1
e
, 1
)
-smooth, the all-pay auction is conserva-
tively
(
1
2
, 1
)
-smooth and the second price auction is weakly
and conservatively (1, 0, 1)-smooth. We also give a smooth-
ness proof for the hybrid auction in which the winner pays a
convex combination of her own bid and the second highest
bid. Our framework implies that running m simultaneous
first price auctions and bidders have fractionally subaddi-
tive valuations and budget constraints achieves efficiency at
least 1− 1
e
of the optimal effective welfare. All-pay auctions
achieve a guarantee of 1
2
. Second price auctions achieve a
guarantee of 1
2
under the no-overbidding assumption. For se-
quential auctions with unit-demand bidders and no budget
constraints the first price, all-pay and second price auctions
give guarantees of 1
2
(1− 1
e
), 1
4
and 1
2
respectively.
Greedy Direct Auctions. Lucier and Borodin [20] con-
siders combinatorial auctions, whose allocation function is
based on a greedy c-approximation algorithm. When a first
price payment is used, they show that such a greedy auc-
tion has a c + O(log(c)) efficiency guarantee.We improve
this bound, by showing that this mechanism is conserva-
tively (1−e−1/c, c)-smooth implying an efficiency guarantee
of at least 1
c+0.58
. This bound extends to the simultaneous
composition of such mechanisms when bidders have fraction-
ally subadditive valuations across auctions and budget con-
straints. For example, when each auctions sells only a small
number of items, greedy algorithms can do quite well (giving
a
√
k-approximation for arbitrary valuations, if each auction
sells at most k items). Observe, that fractionally subadditive
valuations across auctions allow for complements within the
items of a single greedy auction, hence is more general than
just assuming that players have fractionally subadditive val-
uations over the whole universe of items. In the appendix,
we show that the above analysis is a special case of a more
general class of direct auctions.
Position Auctions. We analyze position auctions for
more general valuation spaces than what has been typically
considered [9, 5]. We use the model of Abrams et al [1],
where each player i has an arbitrary valuation vij for appear-
ing at position j, that is monotone in the position. Most of
the literature in position auctions has considered valuations
of the form vij = ajγivi, i.e. players have only value per
click vi and their click-through-rate is dependent in a sep-
arable way on their quality and on the position. The more
general class of valuations can capture settings where play-
ers have value both for click and for the impression itself,
and settings where the click-through-rates are not separable.
We show that the following very simple first price analog
of the auction of [1] is conservatively ( 1
2
, 1)-smooth: solicit
bids from the players, allocate positions in order of bids and
charge each player his bid. The implied guarantee of 1
2
holds
for simultaneous composition when players have monotone
fractionally subadditive valuations and budget constraints.
Such valuations capture, for instance, settings where bidders
have value vi only for the first k clicks, or settings where the
marginal value per-click of a player decreases with the num-
ber of clicks he gets. In addition a bound of 1
4
is implied for
the sequential composition when bidders value is the max-
imum value among all impressions he got. In contrast, [1]
consider the second price analog of this auction, and show
that it always has an efficient Nash equilibrium, but do not
consider the price of anarchy. We show that the second price
version is conservatively weakly ( 1
2
, 0, 1)-smooth, implying
an efficiency guarantee of 1
4
for simultaneous and sequential
composition of such auctions under the no-overbidding as-
sumption. In the appendix we also consider other variations
of the well-studied GFP and GSP mechanisms for the case
when players have only values per click.
Bandwidth Allocation Mechanisms. We consider the
setting studied by Johari and Tsitsiklis [17] where a set of
players want to share a resource: an edge with bandwidth
C. Each player has a concave valuation vi(xi) for getting xi
units of bandwidth. The mechanism studied in [17] is the
following: solicit bids bi, allocate to each player bandwidth
proportional to his bid xi =
bi∑
j bj
, charge each player bi.
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We show that this mechanism is conservatively (2−√3, 1)-
smooth, implying an efficiency guarantee of approximately
1/4 for correlated equilibria and Bayes-Nash equilibria. The
same efficiency guarantee extends to the case when we run
such mechanisms simultaneously and players have budget
constraints and monotone, lattice-submodular valuations on
the lattice defined on Rm by the coordinate-wise ordering. If
the valuations are twice differentiable, being monotone and
lattice-submodular translates to: every partial derivative is
non-negative and every cross-derivative is non-positive.
Multi-Unit Auctions. For the setting of multi-unit auc-
tions where players have concave utilities in the amount of
units they get, we give two smooth mechanisms. Recently,
Markakis et al. [22] studied the following greedy mechanism:
solicit marginal bids from the agents bij (bij is the declared
marginal value of agent i for the j-th unit), at each iteration
pick the maximum marginal bid conditional on the current
allocation and allocate the extra unit, until all units are al-
located. Markakis et al. [22] studied a uniform-price auction
where each player is charged the lowest unallocated marginal
bid, for every unit she got and showed a O(log(m)) approx-
imation for the case of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria under
a no-overbidding assumption. Here, we show that a first
price version of the above mechanism where each player is
charged his declared marginal bids for the items he acquired
is conservatively
(
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
, 1
)
-smooth, while the uniform
price version of [22] is weakly ( 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
, 0, 1)-smooth, when
the willingness-to-pay of an agent is the sum of his ki high-
est marginal bids when allocated ki units. Therefore our
smooth analysis improves the O(log(m)) bound of [22] to a
constant 1
4
(
1− 1
e
)
and to 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
when a first price pay-
ment rule is used. In addition, the above bounds carry over
to simultaneous composition under budget constraints and
when bidders have monotone and lattice-submodular valu-
ations on the lattice Nm. We show that a simpler uniform-
price auction is also weakly ( 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
, 0, 1)-smooth: solicit
a quantity qi and a per-unit bid bi, consider bids in decreas-
ing order and allocate greedily until all units are sold. The
per-unit price for everyone is the last unallocated bid.
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APPENDIX
A. APPLICATIONS
Our work provides some new results in the context of
efficiency of non-truthful mechanisms and unifies previous
work. For each application we will show how smooth each
mechanism is. Then we will highlight some of the implica-
tions that our framework implies. For conciseness we will
not list all the implications of our framework for each mech-
anism, but one can apply all our general theorems for each of
the applications. In our efficiency theorems for conciseness
we will refer to a correlated equilibrium in the full informa-
tion setting as CE and to a mixed Bayes-Nash equilibrium in
the incomplete information setting as BNE. When we refer
to expected welfare then this would be over the randomness
of the action profiles in the complete information setting and
over the randomness of the valuations, budgets and action
profiles in the incomplete information setting. When we re-
fer to settings with budget constraints our bounds are with
respect to the optimal effective welfare.
A.1 Single Item Auctions
In this section we revisit the three main single-item auc-
tions discussed in Section 6 as well as the hybrid auction
where the winner pays a mixture of his bid and the second
highest bid and give a complete list of our results.
First Price Auction. As explained in Section 6 a first
price auction is (1 − 1
e
, 1)-smooth since for any valuation
profile the highest value player with value vmax can deviate
to submitting a randomized bid b′max drawn from a distri-
bution with density function f(x) = 1
vmax−x and support
[0, (1− 1/e)vmax]. Here we observe that the above deviation
also implies conservative smoothness.
Corollary A.1 The first price single-item auction is con-
servatively (1− 1
e
, 1)-smooth.
Corollary A.2 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m simultaneous first price auctions and bidders have budgets
and fractionally subadditive valuations then every CE and
BNE achieves at least e−1
e
≈ 0.63 of the expected optimal
effective welfare.
Corollary A.3 (Sequential) If we run m sequential first-
price auctions with unit-demand bidders then every CE and
BNE achieves 1
2
e−1
e
≈ 0.32 of the expected optimal social
welfare.
All-Pay Auction. The all-pay auction is (1/2, 1)-smooth
since the highest value player submit a bid drawn uniformly
at random from [0, vmax] as shown in section 6. Observe
again that this deviation also implies conservative smooth-
ness. Hence:
Corollary A.4 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m simultaneous all-pay auctions and bidders have budgets
and fractionally subadditive valuations then the expected ef-
fective welfare at every CE in the complete information case
and at every BNE in the incomplete information case is at
least 1/2 of the expected optimal effective welfare.
Corollary A.5 (Sequential) If we run m sequential all-
pay auctions with unit-demand bidders then every CE and
BNE achieves 1/4 of the expected optimal social welfare.
Second Price Auction. In a second-price auction the
winning bidder pays the second highest bid. Here we show
that the second price auction is weakly (1, 0, 1)-smooth. Ob-
serve that in a hybrid auction the willingness to pay of a
winning bidder is exactly his bid. This can be easily shown
since the highest value player can switch to bidding his true
value in which case his utility is at least vmax − b where b
was the highest bid in the previous strategy profile and hence
the willingness-to-pay of the winning bidder in the previous
strategy profile.
Lemma A.6 The second price auction is weakly (1, 0, 1)-
smooth.
Corollary A.7 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m simultaneous second price auction and bidders have bud-
gets and fractionally subadditive valuations then any CE and
BNE that satisfies the weak no-overbidding assumption glob-
ally, achieves at least 1/2 of the optimal social welfare.
Corollary A.8 (Sequential) If we run m sequential sec-
ond price auctions with unit-demand bidders then every CE
and BNE that satisfies the no-overbidding assumption achieves
1/2 of the expected optimal social welfare.
Hybrid Auction. In the γ-hybrid auction the winner
pays his bid with probability γ and the second highest bid
with probability (1− γ).
Lemma A.9 The γ-hybrid auction is weakly
(γ(1− 1
e
) + (1− γ)2, 1, (1− γ)2)
smooth.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and a bid profile
b. Let bmax the highest bid and vmax the highest value.
The non highest value bidders deviation is bidding 0. The
highest value bidder’s deviation is bidding as follows: With
probability γ he submits a bid according to distribution with
density f(t) = 1
vmax−t and support [0, (1 −
1
e
)vmax]. With
probability (1− γ) he submits his true value.
In the first case the utility of the bidder is at least:
∫ (1− 1
e
)vmax
bmax
(vmax − γt− (1− γ)bmax)f(t)dt ≥
∫ (1− 1
e
)vmax
bmax
(vmax − t)f(t)dt =
(
1− 1
e
)
vmax − bmax
In the case when he submits his true value then when
bmax < vmax he wins and gets utility
vmax − γvmax − (1− γ)bmax = (1− γ)(vmax − bmax)
When bmax ≥ vmax he either loses or ties and in any case
gets non-negative utility and thereby utility at least (1 −
γ)(vmax − bmax).
Thus overall the expected utility from the deviation is at
least:
γ
(
1− 1
e
)
vmax − γbmax + (1 − γ)2(vmax − bmax)
The lemma follows by just observing that the payment under
bid profile b is at least γbmax
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Figure 1: Efficiency bound for the hybrid auction.
Corollary A.10 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m simultaneous γ-hybrid auctions and bidders have budgets
and fractionally subadditive valuations then every CE and
BNE that satisfies the no-overbidding assumption achieves
γ(1− 1
e
)+(1−γ)2
1+(1−γ)2 of the expected optimal social welfare.
Corollary A.11 (Sequential) If we run m sequential γ-
hybrid auctions with unit-demand bidders then every CE and
BNE achieves
γ(1− 1
e
)+(1−γ)2
2+(1−γ)2 of the expected optimal social
welfare.
A.2 Direct Auctions.
In this section we will focus on mechanisms where play-
ers directly report their values. These mechanisms show
an interesting use of threshold bids (critical also in truthful
mechanism design) in smooth mechanism design. In a direct
mechanism the player declares a value v˜i(xi) for any alloca-
tion outcome xi. Thus the action space Ai of each player
defined by the mechanism is equal to the set of valuations
Vi.
We will focus on direct mechanisms that are also ex-post
individually rational. We apply the individual rationality
constraint to non-truthful mechanisms in the sense of re-
quiring that if reporting valuations truthfully the resulting
utility of any agent is non-negative point-wise over every
randomness of the mechanism. Note that this doesn’t im-
ply that the player do reports truthfully. It just places the
the restriction on the allocation function X : A → X and
the payment function P : A → Rn+ of the mechanism that
Pi(v˜) ≤ v˜i(Xi(v˜)).
To motivate the connection to truthful mechanism design,
we first describe a single-dimensional service-based mecha-
nism design setting. Consider a setting where the alloca-
tion space is just a feasibility set of players that can be
served. In other words the outcome space from the perspec-
tive of each player is binary Xi = {0, 1} and the outcome
space of the mechanism is some feasible subset of the prod-
uct space. In addition, suppose that the value of a player
was just a number vi for being served. The utility of an
agent would then be of the form ui(x, p) = vixi − pi, where
xi is either 0 or 1. It is a well known result that an ef-
ficient truthful direct mechanism needs to charge player i,
the minimum value he needs to have to still be allocated:
Pi(v˜) = τi(v˜−i) = inf{z : Xi(z, v˜−i) = 1} and 0 if he is not
allocated.
Is there a similar characterization for the more general
setting? For more general settings the standard mechanism
that is efficient and guarantees non-negative prices and in-
dividual rationality is the VCG mechanism. Unfortunately,
the VCG mechanism doesn’t have a similar simple ”thresh-
old bid” interpretation. Despite this fact, one could still de-
fine threshold bids in the more general quasi-linear setting
as follows:
Definition A.12 Given a direct mechanism M and a bid
profile v˜, we say that the threshold bid τi(xi, v˜−i) of player
i for allocation xi is the minimal value that player i has
to single mindedly declare for allocation xi such that he is
allocated xi whenever v˜i(xi) ≥ τi(xi, v˜−i).
To make a mechanism truthful in a single parameter set-
ting remember that one had to strongly tie together the
threshold bids of the players with their actual payments.
In what follows we show that even in smooth mechanism
design in order to get approximately efficient smooth mech-
anisms one needs to approximately tie threshold bids to the
payments.
Definition A.13 A direct mechanism is c-threshold approx-
imate, for some c ≥ 0, if for any feasible allocation x ∈ X
and any reported valuation profile v˜:∑
i
τi(xi, v˜−i) ≤ c
∑
i
Pi(v˜) (10)
The above relation between threshold bids and payments
is in the essence of the analysis of Lucier and Borodin [20]
as described in the next section.
As an example, consider a first price single item auction
setting. Consider a bid profile v˜ and a feasible allocation
where player i wins. The threshold payment for player i
to win the auction is exactly equal to the payment that
the winner was paying under bid profile v˜. The rest of the
players are not allocated hence their threshold payment is
0. Hence, we observe that a single item first price auction is
a 1-threshold approximate mechanism.
First, we show that if a mechanism is c-threshold approx-
imate then this implies a good efficiency guarantee on the
Bayes-Nash Equilibria of the game that it induces.
Theorem A.14 If a direct mechanism is c-threshold ap-
proximate and individually rational then it is(
β
(
1− e−1/β
)
, βc
)
-smooth
for any β ≥ 0. Moreover, it is also conservatively smooth.
Proof. Consider an instance of the valuation profile v
and a bid profile v˜. Suppose that bidder i submits a single-
minded value θ for his optimal allocation x∗i (v). If τi(x
∗
i (v), v˜−i) ≥
t the agent doesn’t get allocated x∗i (v). Otherwise he is al-
located and pays Pi(t, v˜i). Since the mechanism satisfies
ex post individual rationality this payment cannot be more
than t. Otherwise a player with true value t for x∗i (v) would
be getting negative utility.
Thus the utility of a player from this deviation is at least:
ui(θ, v˜−i) ≥ (vi(x∗i (v))− t)1t>τi(x∗i (v),v˜−i)
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Now a player by using a randomized Θ that follows a distri-
bution with density f(θ) = β
vi(x
∗
i (v))−θ
for θ ∈ [0, vi(x∗i (v))(1−
e−1/β)] he will get expected utility at least:
ui(Θ, v˜−i) ≥
∫ vi(x∗i (v))(1−e−1/β)
τi(x
∗
i (v),v˜−i)
(vi(x
∗
i (v))− t)f(θ)dθ
≥ β
(
1− e−1/β
)
vi(x
∗
i (v))− βτi(x∗i (v), v˜−i)
Adding over all players and using the c-threshold payment
approximate property we get the theorem.
A second price auction on the other hand is not threshold
approximate for any µ. The reason is the following: con-
sider a type profile v and a bid profile v˜ where a player with
a very small value bids a huge number H and the rest of the
players bid truthfully. Then the threshold payment for the
highest value player isH , while the payment that the auction
receives is of the order of the values of the rest of the play-
ers. Thus payments and threshold payments are unrelated.
The latter is the crucial difference between first price and
second price payment rules and the reason why we need to
employ no-overbidding assumptions to give efficiency guar-
antees for second-price payment schemes. Similar to how
c-threshold approximate direct mechanisms are connected
to smoothness, the following property of weak c-threshold
approximate mechanisms is connected to weak smoothness:
Definition A.15 A direct mechanism is weakly (c1, c2)-threshold
approximate, for some c1, c2 ≥ 0, if for any feasible alloca-
tion x ∈ X and any reported valuation profile v˜:∑
i
τi(xi, v˜−i) ≤ c1
∑
i
Pi(v˜) + c2
∑
i
Bi(v˜i, Xi(v˜)) (11)
Theorem A.16 If a direct mechanism is (c1, c2)-threshold
approximate and individually rational then it is weakly and
conservatively(
β
(
1− e−1/β
)
, βc1, βc2
)
-smooth
for any β ≥ 0.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem A.14 and is omitted.
Greedy Direct Combinatorial Auctions A very in-
teresting instance of c-threshold approximate mechanisms in
the literature is that of Greedy Direct Auctions introduced
by Lucier and Borodin [20]. In the terminology that we
introduced in the previous section, Lucier and Borodin [20]
proved that in any direct combinatorial auction setting if the
allocation is decided by a greedy c-approximate mechanism
then coupling the mechanism with a first price payment rule
we get a c-threshold approximate mechanism. These proofs
don’t assume anything about the valuation of a player and
allow for complements.
We note that not all greedy algorithms adhere to the
framework defined by Lucier and Borodin [20]. In Section
A.7 we show how smoothness can capture a version of the
2-approximation algorithm by Lehmann et al.[19] not cap-
tured by [20]. The greedy mechanisms studied in [20] are as
follows.
1. Solicit valuation reports v˜.
2. At each iteration pick an (agent, set) pair (i, S) that
maximizes a ranking function r(i, S, v˜i(S)), and allo-
cate S to i.
3. Remove both i and S from consideration and repeat
until all items are allocated.
The ranking function is monotone in S (by inclusion) and
vi(S) and could potentially be adaptive with respect to the
existing allocation. For the case of general combinatorial
auctions a
√
k-approximate greedy such algorithm exists,
where k is the number of items.
Hence, for the setting of greedy first price c-approximate
combinatorial auctions our framework implies:
Corollary A.17 Any CE or BNE of a greedy c-approximate
first price combinatorial auction achieves at least 1−e
−c
c
of
the expected optimal social welfare. If bidders have budgets
then it achieves the same fraction of the optimal effective
welfare.
Lucier and Borodin [20] give a bound of 1
c+O(log(c))
for
the efficiency of such a greedy auction. More specifically the
bound is c−1−log(c)
c(c+1+log(c))
. Our bound is asymptotically same,
but is strictly better. Our bound decreases as 1
c+O(ce−c)
rather than 1
c+O(log(c))
. When c = 1 the bound coincides
with the bound of 1− 1
e
for the first price single item auction
and our bound is always larger than 1
c+ 1
e−1
≈ 1
c+0.58
and
thereby decreases exactly linearly with c.
Our composability framework gives new results for the
case when several greedy combinatorial auctions are run si-
multaneously or sequentially.
Corollary A.18 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m greedy c-approximate first price combinatorial auctions si-
multaneously and bidders have budgets and fractionally sub-
additive valuations across mechanisms, then any CE and
any BNE achieves at least 1−e
−c
c
of the expected optimal
effective welfare.
Corollary A.19 (Sequential) If we runm greedy c-approximate
first price combinatorial auctions sequentially and bidders
have unit-demand valuations across mechanisms, then any
CE and any BNE achieves at least 1−e
−c
c+1
of the expected
optimal social welfare.
Recall that fractional subadditivity across mechanisms does
not impose any assumption on the valuations within each
greedy combinatorial auction. Hence, the valuations of the
bidders could have complements within the items sold in
each greedy auction, as long as they don’t have complements
across items sold in different auctions.
Lucier and Borodin [20] also examine a second-price type
of payment scheme where each agent is charged his thresh-
old bid for the allocation that he is awarded. In such a
mechanism the willingness-to-pay for an allocation is ex-
actly a player’s bid for that allocation. They show that
the mechanism is weakly (0, c)-threshold approximate. By
applying theorem A.16 for β = 1 we get an efficiency guaran-
tee β(1−e
−1/β)
βc+1
= 1−1/e
c+1
for an individual greedy mechanism
and for simultaneous and sequential composition. Instead
of using the generic smoothness result of Theorem A.16,
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by reinterpreting the techniques of Lucier and Borodin [20]
we can easily show that this mechanism is actually weakly
(1, 0, c)-smooth, by considering the deviation where each
player switches to single-mindedly bidding his true valuation
on his optimal set 1. This gives the slightly better efficiency
guarantee of 1
c+1
.
A.3 Position Auctions
In this section we consider a generalized version of posi-
tion auctions introduced by Abrams et al [1], which allows
us to extend analysis of ad auctions to simultaneous and
sequential composition as well as to the case where players
have budget constraints. It also allows us to capture set-
tings where bidders have values not only per-click but also
per-impression, which is considered an interesting direction
from a practical perspective since many companies on the
web strive mainly for impressions rather than clicks. We also
propose new simple mechanisms that are approximately ef-
ficient and robust in terms of simultaneous and sequential
composition and in terms of budget constraints.
Consider a setting where the outcome space is an alloca-
tion of n positions to n agents. Each agent has a valuation
vij for being allocated position j and such that the valua-
tions of all the agents are monotone decreasing: if j ≤ j′
then vij ≥ vij′ . The value vij could be thought of as the
value of player i for appearing at position j. This value
could consist of a per-click part and a per-impression part.
For instance, if the bidder thinks that his click-through-rate
at position j is aij and knows that his value per-click is v
c
i ,
while he also has a value vimij for appearing at position j, then
his valuation for position j is: vij = aijv
c
i + v
im
ij . We just
assume that the above total value is monotone in position.
Observe that in our framework notation the allocation
space X consists of vectors x = (j1, . . . , jn) such that ji 6= ji′
for all i 6= i′. In addition the allocation space of each player
Xi = {1, . . . , n} is totally ordered from his perspective (in
that any outcome where he gets a higher position is greater
than any outcome where he gets a lower one) and the value
of a player is monotone with respect to his own ordering of
allocations.
A position mechanism M defines the action space of the
players. We will consider here mechanisms where players
submit only a single bid bi (interpreted differently by the
different mechanisms that we consider). Given a bid profile,
the allocation function of a position mechanism is to assign
a position ji(b) to each player i and the payment of each
player is some function of the bid profile Pi(b).
We show that for the class of position-monotone valu-
ations a greedy first price pay-per-impression mechanism
(Mechanism 1) is ( 1
2
, 1)-smooth and its second price analog
is weakly ( 1
2
, 0, 1)-smooth.
Lemma A.20 Mechanism 1 is conservatively
(
1
2
, 1
)
-smooth
when valuations are monotone in the position.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and any bid profile
b and let j∗i be the optimal position of player i under val-
uation profile v. Suppose that player i deviates to bidding
1Since the mechanism charges threshold bids, the util-
ity of a player from this deviation is at least vi(x
∗
i (v)) −
τi(x
∗
i (v), v˜−i). Summing over all players and using the fact
that the greedy mechanism is (0, c)-threshold approximate
we get the weak (1, 0, c)-smoothness result.
MECHANISM 1: Greedy first price pay-per-impression
mechanism.
1 Solicit a single bid bi from each player i;
2 Order the players according to bids;
3 Allocate positions to players in the order of the bids (i.e.
the highest bidder gets the first position, etc.);
4 Charge each player his bid bi
according to the uniform distribution U [0, vij∗i ]. For a given
bid profile b, let π(j) be the player allocated at position j. If
the bid that the player submits is greater than bπ(j∗i ) then he
is allocated position at least as high as j∗i . By monotonicity
of valuations with respect to position we get that his utility
from the deviation is at least:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) ≥
∫ vij∗
i
0
(
vij∗i · 1{bπ(j∗i )<t} − t
)
f(t)dt
≥
∫ vij∗
i
bπ(j∗
i
)
vij∗i f(t)dt−
∫ vij∗
i
0
tf(t)dt
= vij∗i − bπ(j∗i ) −
vij∗i
2
=
vij∗i
2
− bπ(j∗i )
where f(x) = 1/vij∗i is the density function. Summing over
all players we get the theorem.
The fact that the above mechanism is smooth for any
monotone valuation allows us to invoke Theorem 3.8 and
get composability results. In addition the fact that the class
of monotone valuations is closed under cappings allows us
to invoke our budget constraint results.
Corollary A.21 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m greedy first price pay-per-impression mechanisms simulta-
neously and bidders have monotone fractionally subadditive
valuations and budget constraints then any CE and BNE
achieves at least 1/2 of the expected optimal effective wel-
fare.
Corollary A.22 (Sequential) If we runm greedy first price
pay-per-impression mechanisms sequentially and bidders have
unit-demand valuations then every CE and BNE achieves at
least 1/4 of the expected optimal welfare.
Note that in the last theorem, unit-demand valuations
in our terminology, means that a players value for getting
several impressions at different position mechanisms is of the
form:
vi(j
1
i , j
2
i , . . . , j
m
i ) = max
k∈[m]
vki (j
k
i ),
where the induced valuations vki (j
k
i ) are monotone in the
position jki allocated at position mechanism Mk.
Threshold-Price Mechanism 1. We also consider the
variation of Mechanism 1 studied in Abrams et al. [1], where
each player is charged the bid of the player in the position
beneath him. We show that such a mechanism is conserva-
tively and weakly
(
1
2
, 0, 1
)
-smooth, implying a bound of 1/4
in isolation, when composed simultaneously under budget
constraints and when composed sequentially.
In [1] it was shown that in the full information setting
there will always exist a Pure Nash Equilibrium of this mech-
anism that achieves optimal social welfare, thereby general-
izing the result of Edelman et al [9] where only valuations
per-click where considered. However, no price of anarchy
analysis exists for this mechanism and the Bayesian setting
or solution concepts that use randomization have not been
studied.
First, we clarify our no-overbidding assumption for the
mechanism of [1]. In this mechanism when a player is allo-
cated position j with a bid bi then his maximum willingness-
to-pay is bi, since in the strategy profile where the player in
position j + 1 bids bi too, he is charged bi. Thus under
Definition 7.1 of willingness-to-pay we have:
Bi(bi, j) = bi
Using a proof identical to that of Lemma A.20 we can show
the weak and conservative smoothness of this mechanism.
Lemma A.23 The threshold price version of Mechanism 1
where each player is charged the bid in the position beneath
him is weakly and conservatively
(
1
2
, 0, 1
)
-smooth.
Our no-overbidding assumption states that in expectation
no player is bidding more than his value for the expected
position he gets. A randomized bid profile b satisfies the
no-overbidding assumption if:
Ebi [bi] ≤ Eb[viji(b)]
If a player participates in many position auctions his strat-
egy is to submit a bid bki at each position auction Mk. Let
bi = (b
k
i )k∈[m] and b
k = (bki )i∈[n]. Then the no-overbidding
assumption generalizes to:
Ebi

 ∑
k∈[m]
bki

 ≤ Eb [vi(j1i (b1), . . . , jmi (bm))]
Under this no-overbidding assumption, our framework gives
the following results.
Corollary A.24 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m greedy threshold price pay-per-impression mechanisms si-
multaneously and bidders have monotone fractionally sub-
additive valuations and budget constraints then any CE and
BNE that satisfies the no-overbidding assumption, achieves
at least 1/4 of the expected optimal effective welfare.
Corollary A.25 (Sequential) If we run m greedy thresh-
old price pay-per-impression mechanisms sequentially and
bidders have unit-demand valuations then every CE and BNE
that satisfies the no-overbidding assumption, achieves at least
1/4 of the expected optimal welfare.
A.3.1 Per-Click Valuations
To draw a stronger connection with existing position auc-
tion literature we now examine the case when bidders have
only valuations per-click and not per impression. We will
consider two special cases of bidder valuations:
1. vij = aij v˜ij : click-through-rates of player i at position
j depend on both i and j in a non-separable way and
players have position specific per-click valuations.
2. vij = aij v˜i: per-click valuations are position indepen-
dent
While this class of valuations neglects effects captured
by the more general valuation models, special cases of this
model are widely used in the literature. The latter case
contains the separable model that has been long studied in
the algorithmic game theory literature and has become the
standard [9, 5, 21].
Definition A.26 We say that the click through rates are
separable, when aij = αjγi for all i and j, that is, the click
through rate is the product of a factor depending on the slot
and a factor depending on the advertiser.
We use our smoothness framework to strengthen results
in the literature. We give a simple smooth mechanism for
the first case, which is equivalent to the standard form of the
Generalized First Price (GFP) auction when specialized to
the case of separable click-through rates aij = αjγi, showing
an 1/2 efficiency bound on GFP and its generalization to
the first case above, and an 1/4 efficiency bound for the
corresponding second price analog.
For the second case, we show that the above auction is
(1 − 1/e, 1) smooth when using first price and weakly (1 −
1/e, 0, 1) smooth when using second price. This result gen-
eralizes the efficiency bound of 1
2
(1− 1
e
) of Caragiannis et al
[5] that considered only the separable case when aij = αjγi.
Note, however, that this class of valuations is not closed
under capping, so our results do not extend to the case with
budgets. The smoothness results we provide in the remain-
der of the section do imply efficiency guarantees in isola-
tion and for special cases of complement-free valuations (e.g.
bidders have value only for the k highest impressions they
got and their value per impression is of the form for which
smoothness is proved).
Variable Click Value. First we consider the case when
each bidder i has a click-through-rate aij ∈ [0, 1] when he
occupies position j and a value v˜ij when he receives a click at
position j. We assume that aij and v˜ij are both decreasing
in j. In addition, players submit per click bids and thereby
are charged aijbi. Hence, a player’s utility at bid profile b
is:
ui(b) = aiji(b)(v˜iji(b) − bi) (12)
The utility of a player is quasi-linear with value vij = aij v˜ij
and payment scheme Pi(b) = aiji(b)bi.
MECHANISM 2: Greedy first price pay-per-click posi-
tion mechanism for non-separable click-through-rates.
1 Solicit a single bid bi from each player i;
2 Allocate position 1 to the bidder i1 = argmaxi ai1bi.
Allocate position 2 to bidder i2 = argmaxi6=i1 ai2bi, etc.;
3 If player i is allocated to position j charge him aijbi.
Lemma A.27 Mechanism 2 is
(
1
2
, 1
)
-smooth when click-
through-rates and valuations per click are monotone in the
position.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and a bid profile
b and let j∗i be the optimal position of player i under val-
uation profile v. Suppose that player i deviates to bidding
according to the uniform distribution U [0, v˜ij∗(i)]. Then his
utility from the deviation is:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) =
∫ v˜ij∗
i
0
aiji(t,b−i)(v˜iji(t,b−i) − t)f(t)dt
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where f(x) = 1/v˜ij∗(i) is the density function. Let π(j
∗
i )
be the player allocated at position j∗i under bid profile b.
Observe that if aij∗i t ≥ aπ(j∗i )j∗i bπ(j∗i ) then if player i hasn’t
already been allocated a higher position he will definitely
win position j∗i . Thereby, for t in the above range we know
that player i will get a position higher than or equal to j∗i .
Since v˜ij is decreasing in j and t ∈ [0, v˜ij∗i ] for
t ≥ aπ(j
∗
i )j
∗
i
aij∗i
bπ(j∗i ) = τi
we have that v˜iji(t,b−i) − t is positive. By the monotonicity
of aij with respect to j we have:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) ≥
∫ v˜ij∗
i
τi
aij∗i (v˜ij∗i − t)f(t)dt−
∫ τi
0
aiji(t,b−i)tf(t)dt
≥
∫ v˜ij∗
i
τi
aij∗i (v˜ij∗i − t)f(t)dt−
∫ τi
0
aij∗i tf(t)dt
=
∫ v˜ij∗
i
τi
aij∗i v˜ij∗i f(t)dt−
∫ vij∗
i
0
aij∗i tf(t)dt
= aij∗i v˜ij∗i − aij∗i τi −
∫ v˜ij∗
i
0
aij∗i tf(t)dt
= aij∗i v˜ij∗i − aπ(j∗i )j∗i bπ(j∗i ) − aij∗i
v˜ij∗i
2
=
aij∗i v˜ij∗i
2
− aπ(j∗i )j∗i bπ(j∗i )
By summing over all players we get the theorem.
Separable CTRs. Observe that when the click-through-
rates are separable, then Mechanism 2 takes the standard
form of the Generalized First Price (GFP) auction that
has been studied in the literature. Specifically, the allo-
cation function of Mechanism 2 can be concisely described
as: weight each players bid by his quality factor and allocate
positions in order of the weighted bid. Each player is then
charged his bid, per-click: aji(b)γibi. Hence, the utility of a
player at some bid profile is:
ui(b) = aji(b)(v˜iji(b) − bi) (13)
The specialization of Lemma A.27 for separable click-through-
rates gives a 1
2
efficiency bound for the Generalized First
Price auction even when the per-click valuations of the play-
ers.
Corollary A.28 The Generalized First Price Auction is
(
1
2
, 1
)
-
smooth when click-through-rates are separable and valuations
per-click are dependent on the position.
Position independent value-per-click. Better smooth-
ness properties can be derived if the value per-click of a
player is the same for all positions (denoted by v˜i), even
when click-through-rates are not separable.
Lemma A.29 Mechanism 2 is
(
1− 1
e
, 1
)
-smooth when per-
click valuations are position independent even if click-through-
rates are not separable.
Proof. Suppose that player i deviates to bidding accord-
ing to distribution with density function f(t) = 1
v˜i−t and
support [0, (1− 1
e
)v˜i]. As stated in the proof of Lemma A.27
if
t ≥ aπ(j
∗
i )j
∗
i
aij∗i
bπ(j∗i ) = τi
(where π(j) is the player at position j in the current bid
profile) then player i is assigned a position at least as high
as j∗i . Thus his utility from the deviation is:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) =
∫ (1− 1
e
)v˜i
0
aiji(t,b−i)(v˜i − t)f(t)dt
≥
∫ (1− 1
e
)v˜i
τi
aij∗i (v˜i − t)f(t)dt
=
(
1− 1
e
)
aj∗i v˜i − aπ(j∗i )bπ(j∗i )
By summing over all players we get the theorem.
If the click-through-rates are separable, then this brings
us to the standard model studied in the literature, where
the valuation of a player i from being assigned at position
j is: ajγivi and thereby the utility of a player at some bid
profile is:
ui(b) = aji(b)γi(v˜i − bi) (14)
The specialization of Lemma A.29, gives a better smooth-
ness property for the Generalized First Price Auction.
Corollary A.30 The GFP auction is
(
1− 1
e
, 1
)
-smooth when
per-click valuations are position independent and click-through-
rates are separable.
Threshold Price Mechanism 2. We consider a threshold-
price version of Mechanism 2 where a player is charged, per-
click, the minimum bid he had to make to get his position.
To draw a strong connection with existing position auction
literature we will analyze this mechanism only on the special
case where click-through-rates are separable and valuations
are position independent: vij = ajγiv˜i.
Under this valuation model the threshold-price version
of Mechanism 2 becomes the standard Generalized Second
Price (GSP) auction introduced by Edelman et al [9] and
extensively studied from the price of anarchy perspective
[21, 5]. In this mechanism, under strategy profile b, each
player i is charged
γπ(ji(b)+1)
bji(b)+1
γi
per-click, where π(j) is
the player that got position j under bid profile b, and thus
his utility at some bid profile is:
ui(b) = ajγi
(
v˜i − γπ(ji(b)+1)bji(b)+1
γi
)
(15)
In this mechanism a player’s willingness-to-pay for a posi-
tion j is simply ajγibi since in the special case where the
player beneath him was bidding γi
γπ(ji(b)+1)
bi, player i is
charged an expected total payment of ajγibi. Thus from
Definition 7.1 of willingness-to-pay we have that:
Bi(bi, j) = ajγibi
Our no-overbidding assumption will then become:
Eb[aji(b)bi] ≤ Eb[aji(b)v˜i]
Caragiannis et al [5] use a point-wise no-overbidding as-
sumption that for any bid in the support of a player’s strat-
egy bi ≤ v˜i and prove that such an overbidding is weakly
dominated. That assumption would imply our weaker in
expectation assumption.
Under the no-overbidding assumption and using the same
proof as in Lemma A.29 specialized for separable click-through-
rates would give that the Generalized Second Price auction
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is weakly
(
1− 1
e
, 0, 1
)
-smooth. This implies the efficiency
result of 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
that was given in Caragiannis et al [5]
and the proof of Lemma A.29 is a generalization of their
analysis.
Corollary A.31 The Generalized Second Price auction is
weakly
(
1− 1
e
, 0, 1
)
-smooth when per-click valuations are po-
sition independent and click-through-rates are separable.
In fact applying the same proof of Lemma A.29 we get a
generalization of this result for non-separable click-through-
rates.
Corollary A.32 The threshold-price version of Mechanism
2 is weakly
(
1− 1
e
, 0, 1
)
-smooth when per-click valuations are
position independent, even if the click-through-rates are not
separable.
This result implies an efficiency bound of 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
under
the same no-overbidding assumption that was used by Cara-
giannis et al [5].
A.4 Public Goods Auctions
In this section we consider a first price auction for choosing
a public good and show that it is ( 1−e
−n
n
, 1)-smooth where
n is the number of participants in the mechanism. This
bound is proportional to the number of participants in the
auction. We then give an application of a simultaneous pub-
lic good auction where the number of participants at each
one is small. We leave as a very important open question
whether there exist smooth mechanisms for the combinato-
rial public project setting that imply efficiency guarantees
that are independent of the number of participants.
We consider the following formal setting: there are n bid-
ders and m public projects. The mechanism wants to choose
a single public project to implement and each player i has a
value vij if project j is implemented.
MECHANISM 3: First price public project auction.
1 Solicit bids bij from each player i for each project j;
2 For a project j ∈ [m], let Bj =
∑
i∈[n] bij ;
3 Pick project j(b) = argmaxj∈[m] Bj ;
4 Charge each player his bid for the chosen project bij(b)
A generalization of Mechanism 3 where multiple projects
are to be chosen and bidders have combinatorial valuations
on the projects, is considered by Singer et al [30], who give
an efficiency analysis for pure, correlated and Bayes-Nash
equilibria. For the special case that we describe here, their
analysis implies an efficiency bound of 1
n+1
. The following
lemma gives a slightly better result.
Theorem A.33 Mechanism 3 is ( 1−e
−n
n
, 1)-smooth.
Proof. Consider a valuation profile v and a bid profile b.
Let j∗ be the optimal project for this valuation profile and
let j(b) be the project chosen under bid profile b. Suppose
that each player i deviates to bidding f(t) = 1/n
vij∗−b with
support [0, (1− e−n)vij∗ ] on project j∗ only. Let Bj be the
total bid of project j under bid profile b. Then the utility of
player i from the deviation, even if he is the only one bidding
on project j∗, is at least:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) ≥
∫ (1−e−n)vij∗
Bj(b)
(vij∗ − t)f(t)dt
≥ 1
n
(1− e−n)vij∗ − 1
n
Bj(b)
By summing over all players we get:∑
i
ui(b
′
i, b−i) ≥ 1n (1− e
−n)V ∗j −Bj(b)
Which gives the theorem.
Simultaneous Local Public Good Auctions. Con-
sider a social network setting where players bid for facilities
to be placed on nodes in a social network. Each node is
an agent and when a facility is placed on a node then all
of the neighbors of the node can use it. There exists a set
of facilities Fu that can be placed on each node u (let Fu
contain also the empty facility for the case where no facil-
ity is built). Now we assume that auctioneers run a public
good auction on each node to decide which facility they are
going to place. Specifically, he asks from the node and its
neighbors to submit a bid for each possible facility. Then he
is going to choose the facility that received the highest sum
of bids and charge each player his bid for the chosen facility.
Each mechanism is ( 1−e
−di
di
, 1)-smooth where di is the de-
gree of the node that is auctioned. Now our framework
shows that if we run simultaneous such auctions and the
valuation of a player is a fractionally subadditve valuation
over the facilities placed on his neighboring nodes, then the
overall social welfare of this game will be at most D
1−e−D
where D = maxi di. Similarly, one could imagine of a set-
ting where facilities are not placed on nodes of the graph
but rather on edges of it or on hyper-edges in a hyper-graph
that tries to model groups of interested agents. In such set-
tings our framework implies that the above simultaneous
local public good mechanism has price of anarchy at most
k
1−e−k , where k is the size of the hyper-edge.
A.5 Proportional Bandwidth Allocation
Mechanism
In this section we consider the bandwidth allocation set-
ting of Johari and Tsitsiklis [17]. In this setting a bandwidth
of C is to be split among n bidders. The bidders submit a bid
bi which they have to pay no matter how much bandwidth
they receive. Given the bid profile each player is allocated
a bandwidth proportional to his bid:
MECHANISM 4: Proportional bandwidth allocation
mechanism.
1 Solicit a single bid bi from each player i;
2 Allocate to player i bandwidth xi(b) =
biC∑
j∈N bj
;
3 Charge each player his bid bi
Each player has a concave value function vi(xi) for getting
a share of bandwidth xi, with vi(0) = 0, and his utility is
quasi-linear with respect to payments:
ui(b) = vi(xi(b))− bi (16)
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As one can easily observe the latter mechanism falls into our
general definition of a mechanism with quasi-linear prefer-
ences. We will show that such a mechanism is (2 − √3, 1)-
smooth. This will imply efficiency guarantees of approxi-
mately 1/4 for any CE and BNE as well as for simultaneous
compositions and sequential composition of bandwidth al-
location mechanisms. For the simultaneous setting it also
implies such a bound even when players have budget con-
straints. Johari and Tsitsiklis [17] give an efficiency bound
of 3/4 but their efficiency guarantee is proved only for the
case of pure nash equilibria and only in the complete infor-
mation setting. Hence, though our bound is slightly worse,
it is a bound that extends to a plethora of relaxations and
extensions.
Lemma A.34 The proportional bandwidth allocation mech-
anism is conservatively (2−√3, 1)-smooth when value func-
tions vi : [0, C]→ R+ are concave and v(0) = 0.
Proof. Given a valuation profile v for each player, let
x∗i (v) be the bandwidth allocated to player i in the optimal
allocation. For simplicity we will denote it with x∗i for the
remainder of the proof since we focus on a specific valuation
profile.
Consider the deviation where player i deviates to bidding
uniformly at random Bi ∼ U [0, λvi(x∗i )], for some constant
λ that will be determined later on. Then his expected utility
for any bid profile b−i is as follows:
ui(Bi, b−i) =
∫ λvi(x∗i )
0
vi(xi(t, b−i))
λvi(x∗i )
dt− 1
2
λvi(x
∗
i )
Given the bids of the rest of the players b−i, if player i bids
above
x
∑
j 6=i bj
C−x then he is given a bandwidth share of at
least x for any x. Thus for all the t ≥ x
∗
i
∑
j 6=i bj
µC−x∗i
player i is
allocated a bandwidth of at least x∗i /µ.
Thus by monotonicity of vi his utility from the deviation
is at least:
ui(Bi, b−i) ≥
∫ λvi(x∗i )
x∗
i
∑
j 6=i bj
µC−x∗
i
vi(x
∗
i /µ)
λvi(x∗i )
dt− 1
2
λvi(x
∗
i )
By concavity and the fact that vi(0) = 0 we know that
vi
(
x∗i
µ
)
≥ vi(x∗i )
µ
for any µ ≥ 1. Thus:
ui(Bi, b−i) ≥
∫ λvi(x∗i )
x∗
i
∑
j 6=i bj
µC−x∗
i
vi(x
∗
i )
µλvi(x∗i )
dt− 1
2
λvi(x
∗
i )
=
∫ λvi(x∗i )
x∗
i
∑
j 6=i bj
µC−x∗
i
1
µλ
dt− 1
2
λvi(x
∗
i )
=
1
µ
vi(x
∗
i )− 1λµ
x∗i
∑
j 6=i bj
µC − x∗i
− 1
2
λvi(x
∗
i )
Since x∗i ≤ C and
∑
j 6=i bj ≤
∑
j bj we get:
ui(Bi, b−i) ≥ 1
µ
vi(x
∗
i )− 1
λµ
x∗i
∑
j bj
(µ− 1)C −
1
2
λvi(x
∗
i )
Summing over all players we get:
∑
i
ui(Bi, b−i) ≥
(
1
µ
− λ
2
)∑
i
vi(x
∗
i )−
∑
i
1
λµ
x∗i
∑
j bj
(µ− 1)C
=
(
1
µ
− λ
2
)∑
i
vi(x
∗
i )− 1λµ(µ− 1)
∑
j
bj
By setting λ = 1
µ(µ−1) we get that the mechanism is (
1
µ
−
λ
2
, 1)-smooth. By optimizing over µ we get that the best
bound is implied by µ = 1
2
(3 +
√
3) for which we get that
the mechanism is (2−√3, 1)-smooth.
Now observe that the valuation space for which smooth-
ness is proved is the set of all concave valuations on R+,
with v(0) = 0. Clearly, R+ is a distributive lattice. Sub-
modularity with respect to R+ simply means concavity. By
theorem 3.9 we know that if several such bandwidth alloca-
tion mechanisms happen simultaneously and the valuation
of the player is submodular on the product lattice, then we
can express such a valuation with induced valuations that
are capped marginals:
vj(x
j
i ) = v(x
j
i ∧ x˜ji , x˜−ji )− v(0, x˜−ji )
Those function are concave with respect to R+ and have
v(0) = 0. Therefore we can apply our simultaneous com-
position theorem for any submodular valuation with respect
to the lattice Rm+ . If the valuations are continuously dif-
ferentiable then submodularity on Rm+ simply means that:
∂2v(xi)
(∂x
j
i
)2
≤ 0 and ∂2v(xi)
∂x
j
i∂x
j′
i
≤ 0. Thus the function is concave
coordinate-wise and has decreasing differences.
In addition observe that even if we cap a submodular val-
uation on R+ then it remains submodular. Thus we can also
invoke our budget constraint theorems.
Corollary A.35 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m simultaneous bandwidth allocation mechanisms and the
valuations are submodular on Rm+ and bidders have budgets
then any CE and any BNE achieve at least 1
2−√3 ≈ 13.73 of
the expected optimal effective welfare.
For sequential composition we get our theorem for the case
where the valuation of the bidder is the maximum among
his valuations on different links: vi(xi) = maxj vij(xij).
Corollary A.36 (Sequential) If we rumm sequential band-
width allocation mechanisms and the valuations are unit-
demand then any CE and any BNE achieves at least 1
2(2−√3)
of the expected optimal social welfare.
A.6 Multi-Unit Auctions with Concave Values
Consider the following setting: An auctioneer wants to
sell k units of a good. A bidder’s valuation is an increasing
concave function vi(j) of the amount j of goods he gets. We
consider the following auction:
We will denote with ki(b) the units allocated to bidder i
under bid profile b. We will also denote with pj(b) to be the
j−th lowest price for which a unit was sold by the algorithm,
i.e. the bid of the j-th from the end unit that was sold. The
utility of a bidder is still quasi-linear with money:
ui(b) = vi(ki(b))−
ki(b)∑
j=1
bij (17)
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MECHANISM 5: Greedy First-Price Multi-Unit Auc-
tion with concave values.
1 Solicit bids bi1, . . . , bik for marginal values from each
player i which are restricted to be decreasing;
2 At each iteration allocate the extra unit to the bidder
that has the maximum marginal bid for getting it,
conditional on the items he has already been allocated;
3 Repeat until all units are allocated or until no player has
value for an extra unit;
4 If player i is allocated ki units then charge him
∑ki
j=1 bij .
We show that the greedy multi-unit auction is ( 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
, 1)-
smooth thereby implying an efficiency guarantee of e−1
2e
≈
1/3.16 when studied in isolation.
Lemma A.37 Mechanism 5 is conservatively(
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
, 1
)
smooth when bidders’ valuations vi : N → R+ are concave
with vi(0) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that bidder i deviates to stating that his
k∗i highest marginal valuations are all t for some randomly
drawn t according to the distribution with probability den-
sity function f(t) = 1vi(k∗i )
k∗
i
−t
and support [0,
vi(k
∗
i )
k∗i
(
1− 1
e
)
].
For his remaining marginal valuations he bids 0. Then the
utility of player i from this deviation is:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) =
∫ vi(k∗i )
k∗
i
(1− 1e )
0
(vi(ki(t, b−i))− ki(t, b−i)t)f(t)dt
=
∫ vi(k∗i )
k∗
i
(1− 1e )
0
ki(t, b−i)
(
vi(ki(t, b−i))
ki(t, b−i)
− t
)
f(t)dt
Since bidder i bids positive only for his k∗i highest marginals
we know that he is allocated at most k∗i units. Hence,
ki(t, b−i) ≤ k∗i for all t. In addition by concavity we know
that for any k ≤ k∗i : v(k)k ≥
v(k∗i )
k∗
i
. Hence:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) ≥
∫ vi(k∗i )
k∗
i
(1− 1e )
0
ki(t, b−i)
(
vi(k
∗
i )
k∗i
− t
)
f(t)dt
=
∫ vi(k∗i )
k∗
i
(1− 1e )
0
ki(t, b−i)dt
For any j ∈ [1, k∗i ], if t > pj(b) then ki(t, b−i) ≥ j. Hence,
we have:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) ≥
∫ vi(k∗i )
k∗
i
(1− 1e )
pj(b)
jdt
=
j
k∗i
(
1− 1
e
)
vi(k
∗
i )− jpj(b) (18)
Now we need to find the right pick of j in our analysis,
such that when adding the above inequality for all players
then the negative part on the right hand side will be the
total revenue of the auction at bid profile b.
Since prices pj(b) are increasing in j we know that:
jpj(b) ≤
j−1∑
t=0
pj+t(b)
If we choose a j such that 2j − 1 ≤ k∗i then:
jpj(b) ≤
j−1∑
t=0
pj+t(b) ≤
k∗i∑
t=j
pt(b) ≤
k∗i∑
t=1
pt(b)
Observe that since k∗i are integers, if we choose j = ⌈ k
∗
i
2
⌉
then we know that j ≤ k∗i+1
2
and therefore 2j − 1 ≤ k∗i .
Thus if we apply Inequality (18) for j = ⌈ k∗i
2
⌉ we get:
ui(b
′
i, b−i) ≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
vi(k
∗
i )−
k∗i∑
t=1
pt(b)
Last observe that since
∑
i k
∗
i = k and prices pt(b) are in-
creasing in t:
∑
i
∑k∗i
t=1 pt ≤
∑k
t=1 pt(b) =
∑
i Pi(b). Hence,
by summing over all players and using the latter inequality
we get the theorem.
Now similar to the bandwidth allocation setting we can
apply our simultaneous composability theorem even under
budgets when players have submodular valuations on the
product lattice on Nm. Submodularity on Nm means that
the functions must be concave coordinate-wise and must sat-
isfy the decreasing differences.
Corollary A.38 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m greedy multi-unit auctions and bidders have submodular
valuations on Nm and budget constrains then every CE and
BNE achieves at least e−1
2e
≈ 1
3.16
of the expected optimal
effective welfare.
For sequential composition we require that the bidders
are unit-demand over mechanisms: e.g. they have mech-
anism specific concave value functions and that their util-
ity is the maximum over all mechanisms of the utility they
get from each mechanism, vi(ki) = maxj vij(kij). Observe
that such valuations are a generalization of the standard
notion unit-demand valuations where players just want one
unit. We could simulate unit-demand valuations with unit-
demand over mechanisms by just saying that vij(kij) = vˆij
if kij >= 1. Our notion of unit-demand valuations over
mechanisms just says that you should pick the mechanism
that gave you the maximum value for the units it gave you.
Corollary A.39 (Sequential) If we run m greedy multi-
unit auctions sequentially and bidders have unit-demand val-
uations over mechanisms then every CE and BNE achieves
at least e−1
4e
≈ 1
6.32
of the expected optimal social welfare.
One could also think of running a second-price equivalent
of Mechanism 5 which is described in Mechanism 6.
MECHANISM 6: Greedy Multi-Unit Threshold Price
Auction with concave values.
1 Solicit marginal bids bi1, . . . , bik from each player i
which are restricted to be decreasing;
2 At each iteration allocate the extra unit to the bidder
that has the maximum marginal value for getting it
conditional on the items he has already been allocated;
3 For each unit that a player receives charge him the
highest marginal bid that the mechanism didn’t allocate
to
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Markakis and Telelis [22] studies exactly this auction and
uses a no-overbidding assumption, where the willingness-to-
pay of a player is the sum of his k highest marginal bids if he
is allocated k units. Under this no-overbidding assumption
and using similar analysis as in Theorem A.37 we can prove
that this auction is weakly
(
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
, 0, 1
)
-smooth, thereby
implying an efficiency guarantee of 1
4
(
1− 1
e
)
. This largely
improves upon the results of Markakis et al. [22] where only
a logarithmic bound in the number of units O(log(k)) was
proved for the case of mixed and Bayes-Nash equilibria. Our
bound also has implications for budgets and simultaneous
and sequential composition.
Uniform Price Auction. Another multi-unit auction
that has been widely used in practice is the Uniform Price
Auction. In the uniform price auction every bidder is asked
to report a pair (qi, bi) where qi ∈ N is a quantity and bi is a
per-unit bid. The auction then orders the bids in decreasing
order and serves the units until reaching capacity.
MECHANISM 7: Uniform Price Auction with concave
values.
1 Solicit quantity, bid pairs (qi, bi) from each player i;
2 Let Qt be the total units allocated until iteration t;
3 At each iteration t pick unallocated player with highest
bi and allocate him min{qi, k −Qt}, until all units are
sold ;
4 Charge everyone the highest losing bid, i.e. the bid of
the last player that was partially satisfied or if the last
player was completely satisfied then the bid of highest
player that was unallocated.
Uniform price auctions are frequently used in practice be-
cause they have the advantage that no-matter what the play-
ers bid, everyone pays the same price for the allocated items.
Hence, they give a fairness feeling and also avoid any fric-
tion when someone was allocated the same unit at a different
price.
In such an auction the willingness-to-pay of a player that
received ki units and bid bi per unit is exactly kibi since
in the worst case the highest losing bid could be just below
your bid.
Lemma A.40 The Uniform Price Auction is conservatively
and weakly (
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
, 0, 1
)
smooth when bidders valuations vi : N → R+ are concave
with vi(0) = 0.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile a = (k, b) and a bid
profile v : N → R+. Suppose that bidder i deviates to bid-
ding a′i = (k
∗
i , t) where t is a number drawn randomly ac-
cording to the distribution with probability density function
f(t) = βvi(k∗i )
k∗
i
−t
and support [0,
vi(k
∗
i )
k∗i
(
1− 1
e1/β
)
].
Denote by Bt the bid of the t-th last unit sold. Similar
to Mechanism 5 it holds that if t > Bj then the player is
allocated at least j units. Thereby using similar analysis as
in the proof of Lemma A.37 we can show that the above
deviation yields utility at least:
ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ β
2
(
1− 1
e1/β
)
vi(k
∗
i )− β
k∗i∑
t=1
Bt
Then by summing among all players we can derive:∑
i
ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ β2
(
1− 1
e1/β
)
vi(k
∗
i )− β
∑
i
ki(a)bi
=
β
2
(
1− 1
e1/β
)
vi(k
∗
i )− β
∑
i
Bi(ai, ki(a))
Setting β = 1 we get the theorem.
We also get the same composability guarantees as Mech-
anism 5:
Corollary A.41 (Simultaneous with Budgets) If we run
m uniform price auctions and bidders have submodular val-
uations on Nm and budget constrains then every CE and
BNE that satisfies the no-overbidding assumption achieves
at least e−1
4e
≈ 1
6.32
of the expected optimal effective welfare.
Corollary A.42 (Sequential) If we run m uniform price
auctions sequentially and bidders have unit-demand valua-
tions over mechanisms then every CE and BNE achieves at
least e−1
4e
≈ 1
6.32
of the expected optimal social welfare.
A.7 Combinatorial Auctions with XOS valua-
tions
Consider a combinatorial auction setting with k items and
n bidders who have submodular valuations. For such a set-
ting Lehman et al. [19] gave a greedy 2-approximation al-
gorithm. In this section we analyze a mechanism based on
that greedy allocation. We will consider bidders that have
XOS valuations on sets of items. One problem with analyz-
ing the greedy algorithm as a mechanism is that it requires
for the players to submit and commit to their whole valua-
tion. That requires an exponential communication. Hence,
we will consider here a simplification of the algorithm where
the bidders are asked to submit only additive proxies to their
valuations.
Remember that XOS valuations when specialized on val-
uations defined on sets of items are characterized by the
following property: for any set S there exists an additive
valuation vSij such that vi(S) =
∑
j∈S v
S
ij and such that for
any other set T : vi(T ) ≥
∑
j∈T v
S
ij .
MECHANISM 8: Greedy Marginal Allocation Auction.
1 Solicit additive bids/valuations v˜ij ;
2 Initialize everyone’s allocation Si = ∅;
3 At each iteration pick an unallocated item j and bidder i
that maximizes the marginal valuation: vij among all
such pairs and make the allocation.;
4 Repeat until all items are allocated.;
5 Charge each player his reported valuation for the set he
won v˜i(Si);
The best known approximation factor to the problem of
welfare maximization for XOS bidders is 1− 1
e
and was given
by Feige [10].
Here we observe that the above mechanism that uses the
greedy allocation rule with the restriction that the players
submit additive proxies is equivalent to running m simulta-
neous first price auctions with XOS valuations and thereby
is (1− 1
e
, 1)-smooth. Therefore the efficiency guarantees that
it provides are the same as the best approximation algorithm
for the optimization problem.
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Similarly, if instead of the first price we charged each
player the minimum he had to bid to win each item, then
that would be equivalent to simultaneous second-price auc-
tions and therefore would be weakly (1, 0, 1)-smooth, leading
to an efficiency guarantee of 1/2.
B. RELAXED SMOOTHNESS FOR
GENERAL GAMES
Consider a complete information normal form game that
consists of a set of players [n], a strategy space Si for each
player i ∈ [n] and a utility function ui : ×iSi → R+. We will
consider a social welfare function SW : ×iSi → R+ that cap-
tures the total utility of all the entities participating in the
game SW (s) =
∑
i ui(s), possibly also considering welfare
to participants that are not explicitly modeled as players,
such the welfare of the customers served or the revenue of
the mechanism.
Given such a game we are interested in studying how bad
the social welfare can be at outcomes that correspond to
well-established solution concepts in game theory and in
comparison with the social welfare optimal outcome. Through-
out this section we will denote with Opt the optimal social
welfare value. We will quantify the efficiency of a solution
concept using the notion of Price of Anarchy which is the
ratio of the optimal social welfare over the worst expected
equilibrium social welfare (since an equilibrium might cor-
respond to a distribution over outcomes).
When is a game smooth? Roughgarden [27] defined
smoothness by the existence of a single socially aware strat-
egy profile s∗ such that in any strategy profile s, an agent
could close his eyes, forget what he and everyone else was
doing previously and then play a socially-aware strategy s∗i ,
and produce a good fraction of his share of the optimal out-
come. More precisely, that such an effect is true in the
aggregate.
Definition B.1 (Smooth Game, Roughgarden [27]) A
utility maximization game is (λ,µ)-smooth if there exists a
(possibly randomized) strategy s∗i for each i ∈ N , such that
for all strategy profiles s ∈ ×iSi:∑
i
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ λOpt− µ
∑
i
ui(s) (19)
The most important property about smooth games is that
any Coarse Correlated Equilibrium of a (λ, µ)-smooth game
has expected social welfare at least λ
1+µ
Opt, i.e. the Price of
Anarchy of Coarse Correlated Equilibria is at most 1+µ
λ
[27].
Hence, the above states that if players are using no-regret
learning strategies when playing a smooth game, then in the
limit the expected social welfare of the empirical distribution
of play will be approximately optimal.
Such a property though it holds for several natural classes
of games might be too strong. A more natural class of de-
viations would allow the deviating player to condition his
deviation at least on what he/she was doing previously.2
2One could also allow the deviating player to condition his
deviation on what everyone was doing prior to the devia-
tion, i.e. on the whole strategy profile s, but such a prop-
erty would imply a Price of Anarchy bound only for the
Pure Nash Equilibria of the game and nothing more, not for
learning outcomes, not for Bayesian version of the game, not
even for mixed equilibria of the full information game.
This is exactly the notion of conditional smoothness that we
introduce:
Definition B.2 (Conditionally Smooth Game) A util-
ity maximization game is conditionally (λ,µ)-smooth if for
any strategy profile s there exists a (possible randomized)
strategy s∗i (si) for all i ∈ N such that:∑
i
ui(s
∗
i (si), s−i) ≥ λOpt− µ
∑
i
ui(s) (20)
However, the fact that we now allow players to condi-
tion their deviation on what they were doing in the previ-
ous strategy profile comes at a small loss. Specifically, the
Price of Anarchy of Coarse Correlated Equilibria of a (λ, µ)-
conditionally smooth game could be much higher than 1+µ
λ
.
However, we can still get that the good Price of Anarchy is
still achieved by all Correlated Equilibria of the game, and
thereby it implies that when players are using No-Internal-
Regret learning strategies then the expected social welfare
of the empirical distribution will be approximately optimal.
Theorem B.3 The expected social welfare of any Corre-
lated Equilibrium of a conditionally (λ, µ)-smooth game
is at least λ
1+µ
Opt. If all players are using No-Internal-
Regret learning strategies then the expected social welfare is
at least λ
1+µ
Opt.
Proof. A correlated equilibrium is a distribution s over
strategy profiles such that for every player i, for every strat-
egy si in the support of s and for every other strategy s
′
i in
Si, player i doesn’t benefit from switching to s
′
i whenever
he was playing si. Since, no player has profit of deviating
to s∗i (si) whenever he was playing si we get:
∀i ∀si : Es[ui(s)|si] ≥ Es[ui(s∗i (si), s−i)|si] (21)
The theorem follows by taking expectation over si and adding
over all players:
Es[SW (s)] = Es[
∑
i
ui(s)] ≥ Es
[∑
i
ui(s
∗
i (si), s−i)
]
≥ λOpt− µEs
[∑
i
ui(s)
]
= λOpt− µEs[SW (s)]
B.1 Bayesian Games
We consider the following model of Bayesian Games: Each
player has a type space Ti and a probability distribution
Di defined on Ti. The distributions Di are independent,
the types Ti are disjoint and we denote with D = ×iDi.
Each player has a set of actions Ai and let A = ×iAi. The
utility of a player is a function ui : Ti × A → R+, which
we will denote by utii (a). The strategy of each player is a
function si : Ti → Ai. At times we will use the notation
s(t) = (si(ti))i∈N to denote the vector of actions given a
type profile t and s−i(t−i) = (sj(tj))j 6=i to denote the vector
of actions for all players except i.
This definition makes a few basic assumptions about the
class of Bayesian Games we consider: a players utility is
affected by the other players’ types only implicitly through
their actions and not directly from their types, the set of
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actions available to an agent doesn’t depend on their types,
and the players’ types are distributed independently.
We will use the most dominant solution concept in in-
complete information games, the Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
(BNE). Our results hold for mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibria
too, but for simplicity of presentation we are going to focus
on Bayes-Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. A Bayes-Nash
Equilibrium is a strategy profile such that each player max-
imizes his expected utility conditional on his private infor-
mation.
∀a ∈ Ai : Et−i|ti [utii (s(t))] ≥ Et−i|ti [utii (a, s−i(t−i)]
Given an action profile a and a type vector t the social wel-
fare of the game SW t(s) is at least the sum of the player’s
utilities
∑
i u
ti
i (a). The welfare of a strategy profile s is the
expected welfare over the types
SW (s) = Et[SW
t(s(t))] = Et
[∑
i
utii (s(t))
]
Given a type profile t we denote with Opt(t) the optimal
social welfare for type profile t.
As our measure of inefficiency we will use the Bayes-Nash
Price of Anarchy which is defined as the ratio of the ex-
pected optimal social welfare over the expected social wel-
fare achieved at the worst Bayes-Nash Equilibrium:
sup
s is BNE
Et[Opt(t)]
Et[SW (s(t))]
B.2 Extension Theorem to Bayesian Setting
In this section we show that the inefficiency bound im-
plied by the weaker notion of conditional smoothness that
we introduced in this section also carries over to Bayesian
versions of a game, i.e. if a Bayesian game is condition-
ally (λ, µ)-smooth for each complete information game that
corresponds to each instance of the type profile then the
Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy of the incomplete information
game is also λ/(1 + µ).
A Bayesian Game is conditionally-smooth if each induced
complete information game is conditionally smooth in the
sense of B.2.
Definition B.4 A Bayesian game is (λ, µ)-conditionally smooth
if for any t ∈ T and for any action profile a ∈ A there exists
a (possible randomized) action a∗i (t, ai) for each i ∈ N such
that:∑
i
utii (a
∗
i (t, ai), a−i) ≥ λOpt(t)− µ
∑
i
utii (a) (22)
Next we prove our extension theorem, that if a full infor-
mation game is conditionally-smooth, than the correspond-
ing Bayesian game also has low price of anarchy. Note that
the function a∗(t, s) allows the coordinate of player i to de-
pends on the whole type profile t, and not only the type of
player i, as a result player i’s coordinate a∗i (t, ai) cannot be
directly used as deviation for that player in the Bayesian
Game. Previous papers by Roughgarden [28] and Syrgkanis
[31] managed to get around this problem by using a ran-
dom sampling technique. However, those papers use the
stronger definition of smoothness where the deviating strat-
egy doesn’t depend on the previous action of the deviating
player. Here we extend previous results for our weaker con-
ditional smoothness property.
Theorem B.5 If a Bayesian Game is (λ, µ)-conditionally
smooth then it has Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy at most
λ/(1 + µ).
Proof. Let t be a type profile and s(t) be a Bayes-Nash
Equilibrium strategy profile that corresponds to type t. Let
a∗(t, a) = (a∗i (t, ai))i∈N be the action profile designated by
the smoothness property of the game for a type profile t and
an action profile a.
We will consider the following randomized deviation for
each player i that depends only on the information that he
has which is only his own type ti: He random samples a
strategy profile w ∼ F . Then he plays a∗i ((ti, w−i), si(wi)).
That is, the player considers the equilibrium strategies s(w),
using the randomly sampled type (including the random
sample of his own type), and deviates from this strategy pro-
file using the strategy a∗ given by the smoothness property
using his true type ti. Using the strategy s(w) as the base,
corresponds to a bluffing technique that was introduced in
[31] in the context of sequential first price auctions, where
player i “pretends” that his type is wi.
Since this is not a profitable deviation for player i, it
means:
Et[u
ti
i (s(t))] ≥ EtEw[utii (a∗i ((ti, w−i), si(wi)), s−i(t−i)]
= EtEw[u
wi
i (a
∗
i ((wi, w−i), si(ti)), s−i(t−i))]
= EtEw[u
wi
i (a
∗
i (w, si(ti)), s−i(t−i))]
Summing over all players and using the conditional smooth-
ness property we get:
Et[
∑
i
utii (s(t))] ≥EtEw[
∑
i
uwii (a
∗
i (w, si(ti)), s−i(t−i))]
≥EtEw[λOpt(w)− µ
∑
i
uwii (s(t))]
=λEw[Opt(w)]− µ
∑
i
EtEw[u
wi
i (s(t))]
(23)
If in the line before the last one we had
∑
i u
ti
i (s(t)) then we
would directly get our result. However, the fact that there is
this misalignment between the player types and the strategy
evaluated, we need more work. In fact we are going to prove
that:
EtEw[
∑
i
uwii (s(t))] ≤ Et[
∑
i
utii (s(t))] (24)
To achieve this we are going to use again the equilibrium
definition: no player i of some type wi wants to deviate to
playing as if he was some other type ti, which gives us:
Et−i [u
wi
i (si(ti), s−i(t−i)] ≤ Et−i [uwii (si(wi), s−i(t−i)]
Taking expectation over ti and wi we have:
EwEt[u
wi
i (si(ti), s−i(t−i)] ≤ EwiEtiEt−i [uwii (si(wi), s−i(t−i)]
= EwiEt−i [u
wi
i (si(wi), s−i(t−i)]
= EtiEt−i [u
ti
i (si(ti), s−i(t−i)]
= Et[u
ti
i (s(t))]
where the equation starting the last line is just a change of
variable names. Summing over all players gives us inequality
(24). Now combining inequality (24) with inequality (23) we
get:
Et[SW
t(s(t))] ≥ λEw[Opt(w)]− µEt[SW t(s(t))] (25)
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which gives the theorem.
C. OMITTED PROOFS
C.1 Section 3: Hierarchy of Valuations
Proof of Theorem 3.3 : We will give the proof of the
general version of the theorem for β-fractionally subadditive
valuation. Let X = ×jXj denote the space of outcomes
for all mechanisms. We first show that if the valuation
is β-XOS over outcomes of mechanisms then it is also β-
fractionally subadditive over outcomes of mechanisms. Sup-
pose that there exists a set of additive valuations L such
that: supℓ∈L
∑
j∈[m] v
ℓ
j(xj) ≤ v(x) ≤ β supℓ∈L
∑
j∈[m] v
ℓ
j(xj).
Now consider an allocation x∗ and a fractional cover (ax)x∈X
of x∗, i.e. for all j ∈ [m], ∑x:xj=x∗j ax ≥ 1. Now we have:∑
x∈X
axv(x) ≥
∑
x∈X
ax sup
ℓ∈L
∑
j∈[m]
vℓj(xj)
≥ sup
ℓ∈L
∑
x∈X
ax
∑
j∈[m]
vℓj(xj)
= sup
ℓ∈L
∑
j∈[m]
∑
x∈X
axv
ℓ
j(xj)
≥ sup
ℓ∈L
∑
j∈[m]
vℓj(x
∗
j )
∑
x∈X:xj=x∗j
ax
≥ sup
ℓ∈L
∑
j∈[m]
vℓj(x
∗
j ) ≥ 1β v(x
∗)
Thus the valuation is also β-fractionally subadditive.
Now we prove the opposite direction: if a valuation is β-
fractionally subadditive over outcomes of mechanisms then
it is also β-XOS over outcomes of mechanisms. Consider
the following linear program associated with an outcome
x∗ ∈ X :
V (x∗) = min
ax
∑
x∈X
axv(x)
s.t.
∑
x:xj=x
∗
j
ax ≥ 1 for all j ∈ [m] (26)
ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X
By the property of β-fractionally subaddtive valuations, since
the set of feasible solutions to the above linear program,
constitutes a fractional cover of x∗ we know that βV (x∗) ≥
v(x∗). In addition we know that we can achieve v(x∗) by
just setting ax∗ = 1 and ax = 0 for any other x ∈ X . Hence,
V (x∗) ≤ v(x∗) ≤ βV (x∗).
Now consider the dual of the above linear program:
C(x∗) = max
tj
∑
j∈[m]
tj
s.t.
∑
j:xj=x
∗
j
tj ≤ v(x) for all x ∈ X (27)
tj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m]
By LP duality we know that V (x∗) = C(x∗). Let tx
∗
j be
an optimal solution to the dual associated with allocation x∗.
Now consider the following additive valuation: vx
∗
j (xj) = tj
if xj = x
∗
j and 0 otherwise. By the constraints of the dual we
know that v(x) ≥∑j:xj=x∗j tj =∑j∈[m] vx∗j (xj). Therefore:
v(x) ≥ sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj)
In addition by LP duality we know:
sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
vxj (xj) =
∑
j∈[m]
txj = C(x)
= V (x) ≥ 1
β
v(x)
Therefore we get that:
sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj) ≤ v(x) ≤ β sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj)
Hence, the valuation is also β-XOS.
Remark. Observe that in the theorem above we used
single-minded component valuations vℓj : Xj → R+ of the
form: vxˆj (xj) = c if xj = xˆj and 0 otherwise. Thus this
gives the corollary:
Corollary C.1 Any fractionally subadditive valuation can
be expressed as an XOS valuation using only single-minded
induced valuations.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 : We will prove that there exist
a set of additive valuations L such that
∀x : v(x) = sup
ℓ∈L
∑
j∈[m]
vℓj(xj)
Each additive valuation in L will be associated with an out-
come x. Denote withMj = {j′ ∈ [m] : j′ ≤ j}. The additive
valuation associated with an outcome x will then be:
vxj (x˜j) =
{
v(xMj )− v(xMj−1) if x˜ = xj
0 o.w.
(28)
First observe that:∑
j
vxj (xj) =
∑
j
v(xMj )− v(xMj−1) = v(x)
Next we will show that for all x˜, x ∈ X : v(x˜) ≥∑j vxj (x˜j).
The latter two facts together will establish that for all x˜ ∈
X : v(x˜) = supx
∑
j v
x
j (x˜j) which will complete theorem.
Fix two outcome vectors x˜, x. Let S = {j ∈ [m] : x˜j =
xj} and Sj = {j′ ∈ S : j′ ≤ j} = Mj ∩ S. By the set-
monotonicity of the valuation we have:
v(x˜) = v(x˜S, x˜−S) = v(xS, x˜−S) ≥ v(xS)
Now observe that:
v(x˜) ≥ v(xS) =
∑
j∈S
v(xSj )− v(xSj−1)
Since for all j ∈ S : Sj ⊆ Mj , by set-submodularity we get
that:
v(x˜) ≥ v(xS) =
∑
j∈S
v(xSj )− v(xSj−1)
≥
∑
j∈S
v(xMj )− v(xMj−1)
=
∑
j∈S
vxj (x˜j) =
∑
j∈[m]
vxj (x˜j)
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The latter equality follows from the fact that for all j /∈ S :
vxj (x˜j) = 0, by definition.
Proof of Theorem 3.7 : This proof is the generalization
of the analogous proof for the case of valuations defined on
sets, presented in [2].
We will show that there exists a set of additive valuations
L such that:
sup
ℓ∈L
∑
j
vℓj(xj) ≤ v(x) ≤ Hm sup
ℓ∈L
∑
j
vℓj(xj)
Each additive valuation in L will be associated with an out-
come x ∈ X . We define the additive valuation associated
with outcome x using the iterative process presented in Al-
gorithm 9.
ALGORITHM 9: Procedure for computing the additive
valuation associated with each outcome x ∈ X .
Input : An outcome x ∈ X and a valuation v : X → R
Output: Monotone valuations vxj : Xj → R for each
j ∈ [m]
1 Set C = ∅;
2 while C 6= [m] do
Pick A = argminA′⊆[m]
v(xA′ )
|A′−C| ;
for each j ∈ A− C do
vxj (x˜j) =
{
v(xA)
|A−C|Hm if x˜ = xj
0 o.w.
(29)
C = C ∪ A;
First we argue that for each x, x˜ ∈ X: v(x˜) ≥∑j vxj (x˜j).
Let S = {j ∈ [m] : x˜j = xj}. By the set-monotonicity of the
valuation we have: v(x˜) ≥ v(xS). Hence, it suffices to show
that:
v(xS) ≥
∑
j
vxj (x˜j) =
∑
j∈S
vxj (x˜j)
Consider the iteration t of Algorithm 9 at which the k-th
element of S is added in C. Since at that iteration the
algorithm chose At we have:
vxk (x˜j) =
v(xAt)
|At −C|Hm ≤
v(xS)
(|S| − k + 1)Hm
Therefore:
∑
j∈S
vxj (x˜j) =
|S|∑
k=1
vxk (x˜j) ≤ v(xS)
Hm
|S|∑
k=1
1
|S| − k + 1 = v(xS)
Hence, for all x˜ ∈ X : v(x˜) ≥ supx∈X
∑
j v
x
j (x˜j).
Now we show that for all x˜ ∈ X : v(x˜) ≤ Hm supx∈X
∑
j v
x
j (x˜j).
Suppose that the algorithm takes T iterations to complete
the computation and that A1, . . . , AT are the sets picked at
each iteration. Then:
sup
x∈X
∑
j
vxj (x˜j) ≥
∑
j
vx˜j (x˜j) =
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈At
vx˜j (x˜j)
=
T∑
t=1
v(x˜At)
Hm
≥
v(x˜∪Tt=1At)
Hm
=
v(x˜)
Hm
Proof of Theorem 3.8 : Consider a valuation v that is
β-fractionally subadditive over outcomes of mechanisms and
monotone with respect to a Cartesian ordering (j)j∈[m].
We will prove that it is also β-XOS over outcomes of mech-
anisms and such that each induced valuation vℓj : Xj → R+,
used in the XOS representation, is monotone with respect
to j .
Consider the following variation of the linear program (26)
used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 associated with an outcome
x∗ ∈ X :
V (x∗) = min
ax
∑
x∈X
axv(x)
s.t.
∑
x:xjjx∗j
ax ≥ 1 for all j ∈ [m]
ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X
Observe that in this variation the first set of constraints is
altered to include a summation over outcomes greater than
or equal to x∗j and not only on outcomes equal to x
∗
j as in
LP (3.3).
Consider a feasible solution ax to the above linear pro-
gram. For x ∈ X , let S(x) = {j ∈ [m] : xj  x∗j}. By the
monotonicity of the valuation we know that:
∑
x∈X
axv(x) ≥
∑
x∈X
axv(x
∗
S(x), x−S(x)) =
∑
x∈X
a˜xv(x)
where, it is easy to see that:
∑
x:xj=x
∗
j
a˜x =
∑
x:xjijx∗j
ax ≥ 1
where the last inequality follows from the constraints of the
linear program.
Therefore a˜x is a fractional cover of x
∗. Hence, by the
property of β-fractionally subaddtive valuations we know
that
β
∑
x∈X
axv(x
∗
S(x), x−S(x)) ≥ v(x∗)
Since, this holds for any feasible ax we get that βV (x
∗) ≥
v(x∗). In addition we know that we can achieve v(x∗) by
just setting ax∗ = 1 and ax = 0 for any other x ∈ X . Hence,
V (x∗) ≤ v(x∗) ≤ βV (x∗).
Now consider the dual of the above linear program:
C(x∗) = max
tj
∑
j∈[m]
tj
s.t.
∑
j:xjjx∗j
tj ≤ v(x) for all x ∈ X
tj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m]
By LP duality we know that V (x∗) = C(x∗). Let tx
∗
j be
an optimal solution to the dual associated with allocation
x∗.
Now consider the following induced valuations: vx
∗
j (xj) =
tj if xj j x∗j and 0 otherwise. By the constraints of the
dual we know that v(x) ≥ ∑j:xjjx∗j tj = ∑j∈[m] vx∗j (xj).
Therefore:
v(x) ≥ sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj)
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In addition by LP duality we know:
sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
vxj (xj) =
∑
j∈[m]
txj = C(x)
= V (x) ≥ 1
β
v(x)
Therefore we get that:
sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj) ≤ v(x) ≤ β sup
x∗∈X
∑
j∈[m]
vx
∗
j (xj)
Hence, the valuation is also β-XOS.
To complete the theorem we just need to prove that the
valuations vxj (·) are monotone under the partial order j ,
for each x ∈ X and for each j ∈ [m]. Observe that vxj (·)
takes the same value (namely txj ) for all x˜j j xj and is 0
for any other x˜j .
Consider two outcomes x˜j , xˆj ∈ Xj , such that x˜j j xˆj . If
xˆj j xj then by transitivity of j we also have that x˜j j
xj and therefore v
x
j (x˜j) = v
x
j (xˆj). Otherwise, by definition
we have vxj (xˆj) = 0 and therefore trivially v
x
j (x˜j) ≥ vxj (xˆj).
Definition C.2 (Lattice-Submodular) If each poset (Xj ,j
) forms a lattice then a valuation is lattice-submodular if and
only if it is submodular on the product lattice of outcomes:
∀x, x˜ ∈ X : v(x ∨ x˜) + v(x ∧ x˜) ≤ v(x) + v(x˜) (30)
and it satisfies the diminishing marginal returns property iff:
∀z  y ∈ X =⇒ ∀t ∈ X : v(t ∨ y)− v(y) ≥ v(t ∨ z)− v(z)
(31)
Lemma C.3 If a valuation satisfies the diminishing marginal
property with respect to a lattice structure then it is also
lattice-submodular. If the lattice is distributive and the val-
uation is monotone then the inverse also holds.
Proof. Consider two outcomes x, x˜ ∈ X . Since x˜  x∧x˜,
by the diminishing marginal returns property we have:
v(x ∨ x˜)− v(x˜) ≤ v(x ∨ (x ∧ x˜))− v(x ∧ x˜)
= v(x)− v(x ∧ x˜)
By rearranging we get that:
v(x ∨ x˜) + v(x ∧ x˜) ≤ v(x) + v(x˜)
Since, x, x˜ where arbitrary the latter holds for any pair
and therefore the valuation is submodular over outcomes
of mechanisms.
Now consider a valuation that is monotone and submod-
ular over outcomes and in addition the lattice (X ,) is dis-
tributive. We will show that for any z  y and for any
t ∈ X the diminishing marginal property holds. Invoke the
submodular property for x = t ∨ y and x˜ = z:
v((t ∨ y) ∨ z) + v((t ∨ y) ∧ z) ≤ v(t ∨ y) + v(z)
Since z  y we have t ∨ y ∨ z = t ∨ z. In addition, by
distributivity of the lattice: (t ∨ y) ∧ z = (t ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z) =
(t ∧ z) ∨ y. Thus:
v(t ∨ z) + v((t ∧ z) ∨ y) ≤ v(t ∨ y) + v(z)
Now by monotonicity of the valuation we know that
v((t ∧ z) ∨ y) ≥ v(y)
Thus we get:
v(t ∨ z) + v(y) ≤ v(t ∨ z) + v((t ∧ z) ∨ y) ≤ v(t ∨ y) + v(z)
By rearranging we get the diminishing marginal property:
v(t ∨ z)− v(z) ≤ v(t ∨ y) + v(y)
Proof of Theorem 3.9 : Now we turn to the case when
(Xj ,j) forms a lattice and the valuation is monotone and
satisfies the diminishing marginal returns property. First
observe that the product poset (X ,) will also form a lattice
and the meet and join functions are also well defined. In this
case we will modify the definition of vxj (x˜j) used in Theorems
3.6, 3.8 as follows:
vxj (x˜j) = v(x˜j ∧ xj , xMj−1 ,⊥−Mj )− v(xMj−1) (32)
We first show that the set of additive valuations satisfy the
XOS definition. Fix two outcomes x, x˜ ∈ X and let xˆ = x˜∧x.
By the monotonicity of the valuations we have that:
v(x˜) ≥ v(xˆ) (33)
Now by the diminishing marginal returns property of the
function over the product lattice and the fact that for all j,
xˆj j xj we have:
v(x˜) ≥ v(xˆ) =
∑
j
v(xˆj , xˆMj−1 ,⊥−Mj )− v(xˆMj−1)
≥
∑
j
v(xˆj , xMj−1 ,⊥−Mj )− v(xMj−1) =
∑
j
vxj (x˜j)
Now we show that each vxj (·) satisfies the diminishing
marginal returns with respect to the lattice (Xj j). Ob-
serve that the negative part in the definition of vxj (x˜j) is
independent of x˜j . Thus it suffices to show that the first
part satisfies the diminishing marginal returns. For that it
suffices to show that the following function:
vj(x˜j) = v(x˜j ∧ xj , x−j) (34)
satisfies the diminishing marginal returns as a function of
x˜j for any x ∈ X , whenever v(·) satisfies the diminishing
marginal returns with respect to the product lattice. Since,
we assumed that the valuation is monotone and the lattices
are distributive we will equivalently show that vj(·) is lattice-
submodular whenever v(·) is:
vj(yj ∧ zj) + vj(yj ∨ zj) =
v(yj ∧ zj ∧ xj , x−j) + v((yj ∨ zj) ∧ xj , x−j) =
v((yj ∧ xj) ∧ (zj ∧ xj), x−j) + v((yj ∧ xj) ∨ (zj ∧ xj), x−j) ≥
v(yj ∧ xj , x−j) + v(zj ∧ xj , x−j) =
vj(yj) + vj(zj)
Where the second equality follows from the distributivity of
the lattice and the inequality follows from the submodularity
of v(·).
C.2 Section 4: Smooth Mechanisms
Proof of Theorem 4.2 : A correlated equilibrium is a
distribution a over action profiles a ∈ A such for every player
i and every strategy ai in the support of a and every a
′
i ∈ Ai,
player i doesn’t benefit from switching to a′i whenever he
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was playing ai. Since, no player has profit of deviating to
a∗i (v, ai) we get that for any ai in the support of a:
Ea−i|ai [ui(ai,a−i)] ≥ Ea−i|ai [ui(a∗i (v, ai),a−i)] (35)
The theorem follows by taking expectation over ai and adding
over all players:
Ea[
∑
i
ui(a)] ≥ Ea[
∑
i
ui(a
∗
i (v,ai),a−i)]
≥ λOpt(v)− µEa[
∑
i
Pi(a)]
By the quasi-linear utilities we have that vi(Xi(a)) = ui(a)+
Pi(a), hence
Ea[
∑
i
vi(Xi(a))] ≥ λOpt(v) + (1− µ)Ea[
∑
i
Pi(a)].
The result now follows if µ ≤ 1. When µ > 1, we use the
fact that players have the possibility to withdraw from the
mechanism and get 0 utility, we have that Ea[vi(Xi(a))] ≥
Ea[Pi(a)], and we get the result.
C.3 Section 5: Composition Theorems
Proof of Theorem 5.2 : Consider a valuation profile v
and an action profile a of the sequential composition. Re-
member that in the sequential composition ai is not a strat-
egy aji for each j but rather a whole contingency plan of
what action aji (h
j
i ) to use at mechanismMj , conditional on
the observed history of play by player i up till mechanism
Mj .
Let x∗ be the optimal allocation for valuation profile v. As
stated, we assume that players have unit-demand valuations
of the form:
vi(xi) = max
j∈[m]
vji (x
j
i )
where vji ∈ Vji . We will denote with j∗i = argmaxj∈[m] vji (x∗ij),
i.e. vi(x
∗
i ) = v
j∗i
i (x
∗
ij∗i
).
To prove the theorem we will give a randomized deviation
a∗i (v, ai) for each agent i such that:∑
i
uvii (a
∗
i (v, ai), a−i) ≥ λ
∑
i
vi(x
∗
i )− (1 + µ)
∑
i
Pi(a)
Remember that this will be a randomization over contin-
gency plans.
Consider the following type of randomized deviation a∗i =
a∗i (v, ai) for player i (the deviation will also be a contingency
plan for each history of play): he plays exactly as in ai
until mechanism j = j∗i and then he plays some randomized
action a∗ij that will be determined later on and will be related
to the smoothness of mechanism Mj . The utility of player
i from this deviation is at least:
uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥ Ea∗ij [v
j
i (X
j
i (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i(h
j
−i)))− P ji (a∗ij , aj−i(hj−i))]
− P j−i (a)
≥ Ea∗ij [v
j
i (X
j
i (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i(h
j
−i)))− P ji (a∗ij , aj−i(hj−i))]
− Pi(a)
where P j−i (a) is the total payment that player i made to
mechanisms that happened prior to Mj . Also aj−i(hj−i) is
the action profile submitted by the rest of the players at
mechanism j when players use contingency plan a in the
global game and hence each observes a history hji produced
by this plan.
Summing over all players we get:∑
i
uvii (a
∗
i , a−i) ≥
∑
j
∑
i:j∗i =j
Ea∗ij [v
j
i (X
j
i (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i(h
j
−i)))− P ji (a∗ij , aj−i(hj−i))]
−
∑
i
Pi(a)
Now observe that∑
i:j∗i =j
Ea∗ij [v
j
i (X
j
i (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i(h
j
−i)))− P ji (a∗ij , aj−i(hj−i))]
represents the sum of utilities when each player unilaterally
deviates to a∗ij in mechanism Mj while previously everyone
was playing aji (h
j
i ) (the action that they are submitting to
mechanism Mj when each seeing a history of play hji in
previous mechanisms) and when all players with j = j∗i have
valuations vji : X ji → R+, while the rest of the players have
value 0 for any outcome. Observe that this history of play hji
is the same as the history of play produced by contingency
plan a of the global mechanism, since the deviation of player
i didn’t change the history up till mechanismMj . Therefore
aj(hj) = (aji (h
j
i ))i∈[n] is the action profile that would have
been played at mechanism m under the contingency plan a.
In fact, the above sum is at least the sum of these utilities,
since we also need to subtract the payments of the players
with 0 valuation to get exactly the sum of the utilities. Let
vj be the valuation profile consisting of the above induced
valuations vji on mechanism Mj .
The value of the optimal outcome in such a setting for
mechanism Mj is at least the value of outcome x∗j . Hence,
the smoothness of mechanismMj says that there must exist
a strategy a∗ij = a
∗
ij(vj , a
j
i (h
j
i )) such that:∑
i
ui(a
∗
ij , a
j
−i(h
j
−i)) ≥ λ
∑
i:j∗i =j
vji (x
∗
ij)−(1+µ)
∑
i
P ji (a
j(hj))
Since the utilities of the agents with 0 valuation never help
the left hand side of the above sum, smoothness actually
implies that there exist strategies a∗ij = a
∗
ij(vj , a
j
i (h
j
i )) only
for the players with non-zero valuation, such that the sum
over the utilities of only those agents is at least the right
hand side in the above equation.
Note again that P ji (a
j(hj)) is the payment made at mech-
anism j under strategy profile a of the global game, since
the deviation of the player didn’t change the history of play.
Thus if we set the randomized strategies of the players to
follow the above smoothness deviation we will get the the-
orem by similar reasoning as in the proof of theorem 5.1.
Observe that the deviation a∗ij(vj , a
j
i (h
j
i )) is a whole contin-
gency plan: play until mechanism j and then observe hji ;
conditional on hji figure out which action you would have
played under your initial strategy ai; then use the smooth-
ness deviation corresponding to this action.
C.4 Section 7: Weak Smoothness
Proof of Theorem 7.4 : For the case of a correlated
equilibrium a in the full information setting, using similar
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arguments as in Theorem 4.2 we can show that:
Ea[
∑
i
ui(a)] ≥ λOpt(v)−µ1Ea[
∑
i
Pi(a)]
−µ2Ea[
∑
i
Bi(ai, Xi(a))]
Using the no overbidding assumption and the fact that ui(a) =
vi(a)− Pi(a) we get:
(1 + µ2)Ea[
∑
i
vi(a)] ≥ λOpt(v)− (µ1 − 1)Ea[
∑
i
Pi(a)]
The result now follows if µ1 ≤ 1. When µ1 > 1, we use the
fact that players have the possibility to withdraw from the
mechanism and get 0 utility, we have that Ea[vi(Xi(a))] ≥
Ea[Pi(a)], and we get the result.
For the incomplete information setting, using similar ar-
guments as in Theorem 4.3 we can conclude that:
Ev
[∑
i
uvii (s(v))
]
≥ λEw [Opt(w)]−µ1Ev
[∑
i
Pi(s(v))
]
− µ2Ev
[∑
i
Bi(si(vi), Xi(s(v)))
]
The result follows by using the no-overbidding assumption
and the quasi-linearity of utilities, similar to the complete
information case.
Theorem C.4 Consider the mechanism defined by the si-
multaneous composition of m mechanisms. Suppose that
each mechanism j is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth when the mech-
anism restricted valuations of the players come from a class
of valuations (Vji )i∈N . If the valuation vi : Xi → R+ of each
player across mechanisms is XOS and can be expressed by
induced valuations vlij ∈ Vji then the global mechanism is
also weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth.
Theorem C.5 Consider the mechanism defined by the se-
quential composition of m mechanisms. Suppose that each
mechanism j is weakly (λ, µ1, µ2)-smooth when the mecha-
nism restricted valuations of the players come from a class
of valuations (Vji )i∈N . If the valuation vi : Xi → R+ of each
player across mechanisms is unit-demand with vij ∈ Vji then
the global mechanism is weakly (λ, µ1 + 1, µ2)-smooth.
Proof of Theorems C.4 and C.5 : The proofs of the
above two theorems are identical to the proofs of Theo-
rems 5.1 and 5.2 combined with the following extra argu-
ment: Since action spaces and outcome decisions at a mech-
anism are independent of those in other mechanisms, the
willingness-to-pay of a player is additive:∑
j
Bji (a
j
i , x
j
i ) =
∑
j
max
a
j
−i:X
j
i (a
j)=x
j
i
P ji (a
j)
= max
a−i:Xi(a)=xi
∑
j
P ji (a
j)
= max
a−i:Xi(a)=xi
Pi(a) = Bi(ai, xi)
C.5 Section 8: Budget Constraints
Proof of Theorem 8.2 : We begin with the following
observation: if for any action profile a in the support of a
random action profile a it holds that Pi(a) < Bi then the
expected utility of a player with a budget constraint Bi is
the same as the expected utility of an unconstrained player
with quasi-linear utilities.
Consider a valuation and budget profile t = (v,B) and let
utii denote the utility of player i with type ti = (vi, Bi). Let
vˆ be the corresponding capped valuation profile where each
players value is replaced with vˆi = min{vi, Bi} and uˆvˆii be a
quasi-linear utility with valuation vˆi.
Since we assumed that the mechanism is smooth in the
quasilinear setting and the valuation space is closed under
capping, for any strategy profile a there exists a random-
ized strategy a∗i (vˆ, ai) for each player such that under the
quasilinear utility setting:
∑
i
uˆvˆii (a
∗
i (vˆ, ai), a−i) ≥ λOpt(vˆ)− µ
∑
i
Pi(a) (36)
and such that for all a∗i in the support of a
∗
i (vˆ, ai):
max
a˜−i
Pi(a
∗
i , a˜−i) ≤ max
xi∈Xi
vˆi(xi) ≤ Bi (37)
Suppose that in the budgeted setting each player i devi-
ates to a∗i (vˆi, ai). Then by the above conservativeness of
this deviating strategy and the initial observation we know
that the expected utility of a budgeted player under this
deviation is the same as the expected utility of a player
with quasi-linear utilities and value vi. Subsequently the
expected utility of a player with quasi-linear utilities and
value vi is at least the utility of a player with quasi-linear
utilities and value vˆi. Thus we get:
∑
i
utii (a
∗
i (vˆ, ai), a−i) =
∑
i
uˆvii (a
∗
i (vˆ, ai), a−i)
≥
∑
i
uˆvˆii (a
∗
i (vˆ, ai), a−i)
≥ λOpt(vˆ)− µ
∑
i
Pi(a) (38)
Using the above property we can now complete the proof
of the Theorem similar to the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and
4.3. The only extra point we need to make is that due to
the fact that a player can always drop out we know that
at any equilibrium solution concept no player is going to
ever be exceeding his budget at any action profile in the
support of the solution concept since otherwise his utility
would have been minus infinity. Hence, at any action profile
in the support of an equilibrium the utility of a player will
behave as if quasilinear. For completeness we present here
the two proofs.
Correlated Equilibrium. Consider the full information
setting and let a be a correlated equilibrium. Since player i
doesn’t want to switch ai with a
∗
i (vˆ, ai) we get:
∀ai : Ea−i|ai
[
utii (ai,a−i)
] ≥ Ea−i|ai [utii (a∗i (vˆ, ai),a−i)]
The theorem follows by taking expectation over ai and adding
27
over all players:
Ea
[∑
i
utii (a)
]
≥ Ea
[∑
i
utii (a
∗
i (vˆ,ai),a−i)
]
≥ λOpt(vˆ)− µEa
[∑
i
Pi(a)
]
For any a in the support of correlated equilibrium a each
player must be paying less than his budget or otherwise his
expected value will be negative and he could deviate to drop-
ping out. Hence, for any a in the support of a the utility of a
player is quasi-linear and we have that vi(a) = u
ti
i (a)+Pi(a).
Hence
Ea
[∑
i
vi(a)
]
≥ λOpt(vˆ) + (1− µ)Ea
[∑
i
Pi(a)
]
.
The result now follows if µ ≤ 1. When µ > 1, we use
the fact that players have the possibility to withdraw from
the mechanism and get nonnegative utility, we have that
Ea[vi(a)] ≥ Ea[Pi(a)], and we get the result.
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. For the case of Bayes-Nash
equilibrium we consider the following deviation for each player
i that depends only on the information that he has which is
his own type ti = (vi, Bi): He random samples a type profile
τ = (w,C) ∼ F . Let wˆi = min{wi, Ci} be the capped ran-
dom sampled valuations. Then he plays a∗i ((vˆi, wˆ−i), si(τi)).
Since this is not a profitable deviation for player i, it
means:
Et
[
utii (s(v))
] ≥ EtEτ [utii (a∗i ((vˆi, wˆ−i), si(τi)), s−i(t−i)]
= EtEτ [u
τi
i (a
∗
i ((wˆi, wˆ−i), si(ti)), s−i(t−i))]
= EtEτ [u
τi
i (a
∗
i (wˆ, si(ti)), s−i(t−i))]
The second equality comes from exchanging the names of
the variables ti = (vi, Bi) and τi = (wi, Ci). Variables ti
and τi are distributed identically and independently with
each other and with any other variable and this enables the
latter name change and regrouping. By doing this change of
variables, vˆi = min{vi, Bi} becomes wˆi = min{wi, Ci}.
Summing over all players and using Equation (38):
Et
[
SW t(s(t))
] ≥ EtEτ
[∑
i
uτii (a
∗
i (wˆ, si(ti)), s−i(t−i))
]
≥ EtEτ
[
λOpt(wˆ)− µ
∑
i
Pi(s(t))
]
= λEτ [Opt(wˆ)]− µEt
[∑
i
Pi(s(t))
]
Again due to the fact that bidders can drop out, we know
that for any action in the support of strategy profile s(t)
a player i is never paying above his budget. If s(t) is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium then it must be that the utility of
a player is quasi-linear in the support of s(t). The theorem
then follows by this quasi-linearity of utility and by the fact
that expected revenue is at most the expected social welfare.
Proof of Theorem 8.3 : The theorem is proved in a
sequence of two lemmas presented below.
Lemma C.6 The simultaneous composition of m conserva-
tively (λ, µ)-smooth mechanisms is also conservatively (λ, µ)-
smooth, when the valuation vi : Xi → R+ of each player
across mechanisms is XOS and can be expressed by induced
valuations vlij ∈ Vji .
Proof. We want to show that the simultaneous compo-
sition is a conservatively (λ, µ)-smooth mechanism. This
means that we should show that it is smooth in the quasi-
linear setting and that the deviations used to show it is
smooth satisfy the property that every action ai in their
support satisfies:
max
a−i
Pi(ai, a−i) ≤ max
xi∈Xi
vi(xi)
The fact that the composition is smooth just stems from
Theorem 5.1, since each component mechanism is conserva-
tively smooth and thereby smooth.
From the proof of Theorem 5.1 we know that for each
action profile a the deviation that is used in the smooth-
ness argument is a randomized deviation a∗i (v, ai) that con-
sists of independent randomized deviations for each mech-
anism j following the distribution of a∗ij(v
∗
j , a
j
i ), where v
∗
j
is the valuation profile for mechanism j where each player
has valuation v∗ij on X ji and where v∗ij is the additive valua-
tion that corresponds to allocation x∗i according to the XOS
definition, i.e., vi(x
∗
i ) =
∑
j v
∗
ij(x
∗
ij) and for all xi ∈ Xi:
vi(xi) ≥
∑
j v
∗
ij(x
j
i ).
Now by conservative smoothness of each component mech-
anism Mj we know that for any action a∗ij in the support
of a∗ij(v
∗
j , a
j
i ):
max
a
j
−i
P ji (a
∗
ij , a
j
−i) ≤ max
x
j
i∈X
j
i
v∗ij(x
j
i ) (39)
For each mechanism Mj let xˆji be the allocation that corre-
sponds to the maximizer on the right hand side of the above
inequality.
By the fact that action spaces are independent across
mechanisms it is easy to see that for any action ai:
max
a−i
Pi(ai, a−i) =
∑
j
max
a−ij
P ji (a
j
i , a
−i
j ) (40)
Any action ai in the support of the randomized deviation
a∗i (v, ai) is going to consist of actions a
j
i in the support of the
a∗ij(v
∗
j , a
j
i ). By Equations (39) and (40) and by the fact that
v∗ij is part of the XOS representation of vi we get that for
any ai in the support of the smoothness deviation a
∗
i (v, ai):
max
a−i
Pi(ai, a−i) =
∑
j
max
a
j
−i
P ji (a
j
i , a
j
−i)
≤
∑
j
v∗ij(xˆ
j
i )
≤ vi(xˆ1i , . . . , xˆmi )
≤ max
xi∈Xi
vi(xi)
The latter completes the proof.
To complete the proof we show a property of capped XOS
valuations across mechanism outcomes:
Lemma C.7 Suppose that a valuation v : Xi → R+ over
m mechanisms is XOS and can be represented by a set of
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additive valuations L. Then the capped valuation vˆ(xi) =
min{v(xi), Bi} is also XOS and can be expressed by induced
valuations vˆℓj : X ji → R+ that are cappings of the induced
valuations vℓj : X ji → R+ of the initial valuation v.
Proof. Let L be the set of additive valuations that are
used to express valuation v, i.e. ∀x ∈ Xi : v(x) = maxℓ∈L
∑
j v
ℓ
j(xj).
Let ℓ(x) be the additive valuation corresponding to outcome
x, i.e.:
ℓ(x) = argmax
ℓ
∑
j
vℓj(xj)
Consider the set of additive valuations Lˆ that contains ℓ(x)
for each x ∈ Xi, potentially having multiple copies of the
same additive valuation. The additive valuation associated
with each ℓ(x) ∈ Lˆ is now defined as follows:
vˆ
ℓ(x)
j (x˜j) = min{vℓj(x˜j), vℓj(xj), Bi −
∑
k<j
vℓk(xk)} (41)
Consider an outcome x˜. We will show that
vˆ(x˜) = max
ℓ(x)∈Lˆ
∑
j
vˆ
ℓ(x)
j (x˜j)
Case 1: If v(x˜) ≤ Bi then:
vˆ(x˜) = v(x˜) =
∑
j
v
ℓ(x˜)
j (x˜j) ≤ Bi (42)
The last inequality implies that for all j:∑
k≤j
v
ℓ(x˜)
k (x˜k) ≤ Bi
which in turn implies that
v
ℓ(x˜)
j (xj) ≤ Bi −
∑
k<j
v
ℓ(x˜)
k (x˜k)
Therefore, for all j:
v
ℓ(x˜)
j (x˜j) = vˆ
ℓ(x˜)
j (x˜j)
Combining with Equation (42) we get:
vˆ(x˜) =
∑
j
vˆ
ℓ(x˜)
j (x˜j) (43)
Now we need to show that for all ℓ(x) ∈ Lˆ: v(x) ≥∑j vˆℓ(x)j (x˜j).
Using the XOS property of the initial representation of the
uncapped value we have:
vˆ(x˜) = v(x˜) ≥
∑
j
v
ℓ(x)
j (x˜j) ≥
∑
j
vˆ
ℓ(x)
j (x˜j) (44)
By Equations (43) and (44) we get that:
vˆ(x˜) = max
ℓ(x)∈Lˆ
∑
j
vˆ
ℓ(x)
j (x˜j) (45)
Case 2: If v(x˜) > Bi then vˆ(x˜) = Bi. First we observe that
by the definition of the capped additive valuations vˆ
ℓ(x)
j we
know that for any ℓ(x) ∈ Lˆ:∑
j
vˆ
ℓ(x)
j (x˜j) =
∑
j
min{vℓj(x˜j), vℓj(xj), Bi −
∑
k<j
vℓk(xk)}
≤
∑
j
min{vℓj(xj), Bi −
∑
k<j
vℓk(xk)}
≤ Bi = vˆ(x˜)
In addition we know that:∑
j
vˆ
ℓ(x˜)
j (x˜j) =
∑
j
min{vℓj(x˜j), vℓj(x˜j), Bi −
∑
k<j
vℓk(xk)}
=
∑
j
min{vℓj(x˜j), Bi −
∑
k<j
vℓk(xk)}
= Bi = vˆ(x˜)
By the above two sets of equations we get again that:
vˆ(x˜) = max
ℓ(x)∈Lˆ
∑
j
vˆ
ℓ(x)
j (x˜j) (46)
Thus we conclude that for any x˜, the above property holds
and therefore vˆ
ℓ(x)
j for all ℓ(x) ∈ Lˆ is an XOS representation
of vˆ that uses only capped induced valuations of the initial
representation of v.
The above two lemmas complete the proof of the theorem
by simply invoking Theorem 8.2.
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